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ABSTRACT 
 
I develop a framework that elucidates how the primary target of auditors’ professional 
skepticism – audit evidence or their own judgment and decision making – interacts with other 
factors to affect auditors’ professional judgments.  As an initial test of the framework, I conduct 
an experiment that examines how the target of auditors’ skepticism and industry specialization 
jointly affect auditors’ judgments.  When working inside their specialization, auditors make more 
automatic, intuitive judgments.  Automaticity naturally manifests for industry specialists as a 
result of industry experience, social norms to appear knowledgeable and decisive, and their own 
expectations to proficiently interpret audit evidence.  Priming industry specialists to be skeptical 
of audit evidence, therefore, has little influence on their judgments.  In contrast, priming such 
auditors to be skeptical of their otherwise automated, intuitive judgment and decision making 
substantially alters their decision processing. They begin to question what they do and do not 
know, in an epistemological sense and, as a result, elevate their overall concern about material 
misstatements due to well-concealed fraud.  This pattern of results is consistent with my 
framework’s predictions and suggests that specialization is more about improving the 
interpretation and assimilation of domain evidence rather than enhancing reflective, self-critical 
thinking.  It also suggests it would be beneficial to identify other factors that promote industry 
specialists’ skepticism towards their judgment and decision making to make them more 
circumspect about the possibility of management fraud (cf., Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Audit standard setters and researchers have long recognized the importance of 
professional skepticism, defined in professional standards as having a questioning mind and 
critically assessing audit evidence (AICPA 2002, PCAOB 2007).  An implicit assumption of the 
academic literature is that the primary target of auditors’ skepticism is audit evidence (i.e., 
evidence skepticism).  Bell, Peecher, and Solomon (2005), however, advocate for a new target of 
auditors’ skepticism – their own judgment and decision making (i.e., judgment skepticism).  In a 
recent review, Nelson (2009) introduces a model of professional skepticism in which three 
factors combine with audit evidence to influence auditors’ professional judgments and actions: 
knowledge, traits, and incentives.  In this dissertation, I integrate dual-processing theory from 
psychology (e.g., Smith and DeCoster 2000) into Nelson’s (2009) model and use the resulting 
integrated framework to predict that auditors’ industry specialization interacts with the target of 
their professional skepticism in influencing professional judgments. 
I posit that specialization is more about improving auditors’ interpretation and 
assimilation of domain evidence than about enhancing reflective, self-critical thinking.  When 
working inside their specialization, auditors tend to make more automatic, intuitive 
judgments.  Automaticity naturally manifests for specialists as a result of industry experience, 
social norms to appear knowledgeable and decisive, and their own expectations to proficiently 
interpret audit evidence (Logan 1988; Sloman 1996).  Priming specialists to be skeptical of audit 
evidence, therefore, has relatively little influence on their judgments.1   Priming them to be 
skeptical of their otherwise automated, intuitive decision processes, however, causes a relatively 
                                               
1
 Elevated professional skepticism generally enhances audit effectiveness, but can be excessive and hinder audit 
efficiency and client relations (Nelson 2009).  For theory testing, I can determine changes in professional skepticism 
attributable to the interplay of different skepticism targets and industry specialization, but not the optimal level of 
professional skepticism for society.  
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substantial shift in their decision processing. They begin to question what they do and do not 
know, in an epistemological sense and, as a result, elevate their concern about fraud.    
This pattern suggests that specialists’ proficiency in interpreting domain evidence comes 
at a previously un-indentified cost – suppressing a novice-like vigilance to question one’s 
thinking.  This cost is troubling as elevating one’s professional skepticism has been put forth as a 
means of fending off motivational and judgmental biases (e.g., Peecher 1996).  In addition, 
regulators allege that insufficient professional skepticism is pervasive (PCAOB 2007) and a 
primary cause of audit failures (Carmichael and Craig 1996) and SEC enforcement actions 
(Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson 2001).   A potential contributing factor is that professional 
standards have only recently and indirectly begun to allude to auditors directing professional 
skepticism towards their own judgment and decision making (e.g., IFAC 2009).  Specifically, 
international auditing standards now explicitly recognize that auditors’ professional judgment 
can and should be evaluated and implicitly acknowledge the possibility of judgment errors; 
however, they neither educate nor equip the auditor for thinking about how to avoid making 
judgment errors in the first place (IFAC 2009).  My integrated framework will be beneficial in 
identifying factors that promote judgment skepticism helping auditors consider potential 
judgment errors including being circumspect about potential management fraud (cf., Bell et al. 
2005).  Likewise, auditing firms may consider including judgment skepticism in their review and 
consultation processes, training programs, decision aids, and performance evaluations.   
As an initial test of my framework, I conduct an experiment with a 2 x 3 between-
participants design (Specialization X Skepticism Target) with 171 professional auditors.  
Auditors complete a preliminary analytical review task (with no seeded misstatement or overt 
fraud risk indicators) in the property and casualty insurance industry.  As auditors rarely 
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encounter fraud (Ashton 1991), a context devoid of fraud risk indicators is ideal because of its 
conduciveness to intuitive, automatic judgments by specialists thereby allowing the strongest test 
of my theory.  Using a partial match-mismatch design (Low 2004), I treat auditors specializing in 
insurance as specialists and all other auditors as non-specialists. I manipulate the target of 
auditors’ skepticism using their supervisors’ preferences as a prime.  That is, the prime varies the 
degree to which it characterizes supervisors as preferring auditors to question audit evidence 
(Evidence Skepticism; ES) or their own judgment and decision making (Judgment Skepticism; 
JS). A third, unprimed, level of this factor is used as a control condition. The dependent 
measures for participants’ self-critical professional judgments are the number and probability of 
fraud explanations along with the probabilities assigned to unknown misstatement explanations.2 
Consistent with my integrated framework, specialists’ professional judgments 
significantly depend on the target of their skepticism.  Unprimed specialists are less concerned 
about unknown misstatements and well-concealed fraud than are unprimed non-specialists.  In 
fact, none of the 19 specialists within the control condition generate a single fraud explanation.  
JS-condition specialists, however, generate more fraud explanations and assign a higher 
probability to unknown misstatement explanations compared to control-condition specialists.  In 
other words, JS-condition specialists worry relatively more about what they do not know and 
doubt whether the absence of overt fraud risk indicators indicates the absence of fraud.  ES-
condition specialists, however, are less concerned about what they do not know, much like 
control-condition specialists.  They do not increase consideration of fraud or unknown 
                                               
2
 In the absence of fraud risk indicators, generating fraud explanations increases the justifiability of auditors’ beliefs 
and potentially increases audit quality.  For instance, medical research indicates the value of having diagnostic (e.g., 
fraud) hypotheses in one’s initial hypothesis set in terms of evidence gathering (e.g., identifying subsequent fraud 
risk indicators) and ultimate diagnostic performance (Barrows et al. 1982).  Also, generating fraud explanations can 
improve audit planning decisions (Hunton and Gold 2009) especially as fraud is most likely to go undetected when 
management goes to elaborate lengths to deceive (Bell et al. 2005).   
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misstatement explanations consistent with use of a highly automated judgment process and high 
baseline confidence in their ability to interpret evidence.  Unlike specialists, non-specialists 
worry about what they do not know irrespective of the target of their skepticism, consistent with 
deliberative judgment processes triggered by industry unfamiliarity.  This pattern of results 
manifests in two significant interactions where JS-condition specialists exhibit the largest 
increases (compared to the control-condition) in the number of fraud explanations and the 
probability of unknown misstatement explanations compared to the increases of ES-condition 
specialists and non-specialists subject to either prime.   
This dissertation contributes to numerous academic literatures.  My integrated framework 
augments Nelson’s (2009) model of professional skepticism by illustrating the critical role that 
the target of auditors’ skepticism – audit evidence or their own judgment and decision making – 
has on auditors’ professional judgments and how this role is moderated by the extent of auditors’ 
specialization.  My framework also answers Nelson’s call for future research that further 
specifies the form of his model, models how factors interactively affect professional judgments, 
and identifies ways to augment and improve professional judgment. I contribute to the industry 
specialization literature by demonstrating that specialization, in the absence of fraud risk 
indicators, may inhibit reflective, self-critical thinking and illustrating the importance of 
identifying factors that promote judgment skepticism in specialists. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, I present my 
integrated framework. In Chapter 3, I use the framework to predict the effects of priming 
evidence skepticism and judgment skepticism for both specialists and non-specialists.  In 
Chapter 4, I discuss the research method.  I report results in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 concludes the 
paper with a discussion of limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I integrate a dual-process representation of professional judgment into 
Nelson’s (2009) model of professional skepticism.  By doing so, I illustrate the critical role that 
the target of auditors’ skepticism – audit evidence or their own judgment and decision making – 
has on their professional judgments and how this role depends on other factors such as the extent 
of their specialization.  Before presenting my integrated framework, I define professional 
skepticism and introduce Nelson’s (2009) model of professional skepticism. 
2.1 Professional Skepticism 
Professional standards define professional skepticism as having a questioning mind and 
critically assessing audit evidence (AICPA 2002; IFAC 2009).3  When making professional 
judgments, auditors can direct professional skepticism towards either audit evidence or their own 
judgment and decision making.  Professional standards and audit researchers typically describe 
the target of auditors’ professional skepticism as being audit evidence (Kinney 2000; AICPA 
2002).  For example, SAS No. 99 states that… 
“...professional skepticism requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and 
evidence obtained suggests that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred. In exercising 
professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating evidence, the auditor should not be satisfied 
with less-than-persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is honest.”  (AICPA 
2002, Paragraph 2.13) 
 
Bell et al. (2005, 34) describe another target – auditors’ own judgment and decision 
making.  This targeting entails “…auditors being preemptively self-critical in anticipation of 
various arguments that others could bring against their beliefs or the evidential base they have or 
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 See Nelson (2009) for a review of academic and professional standard definitions of professional skepticism.  
Academics have proposed two different baseline orientations (i.e., standards of proof) with respect to this definition: 
neutrality and presumptive doubt (see Nelson 2009).  I favor the presumptive doubt definition as it is more 
consistent with regulators’ and society’s expectations of auditors to prevent and detect fraud (Bell et al. 2005).  
However, it is not necessary to do so as my theory about roles of the target of auditors’ skepticism stands with either 
orientation. The neutrality definition is also problematic as asking auditors to be accurate (i.e., neutral) may threaten 
obtainment of client-aligned directional goals and increase their propensity to agree with management (Kadous et al. 
2003). 
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have not relied upon to form such beliefs.” Preemptive self-criticism is a method of coping with 
accountability, particularly to parties with unknown preferences, and entails thinking in flexible, 
multidimensional ways (Tetlock 1983a; Tetlock 1983b; Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger 1989).  
Unlike evidence skepticism, judgment skepticism targets the auditors’ own judgment and 
decision making and involves embracing the potential fallibility of their judgments.  It 
recognizes the possibility of unknown misstatement explanations including well-concealed fraud 
(even when not overtly indicated by the evidence) along with other ways in which their judgment 
could be flawed. An auditor exercising judgment skepticism would also consider potential 
overconfidence through realization that even experts are prone to judgment errors.  Judgment 
skepticism further applies pressure to the “illusion of objectivity” associated with otherwise, 
unconscious motivated reasoning (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987).4  This pressure on the 
reasonableness of motivated reasoning is consistent with professional skepticism being put forth 
as a means of fending off motivational biases favoring management’s preferred conclusions (e.g., 
Peecher 1996) and other judgmental biases.5 
2.2 Nelson’s Model of Professional Skepticism  
Nelson (2009) integrated the extant literature on professional skepticism into a model that 
illustrates how auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives combine with audit evidence to produce 
professional judgments and actions that reflect professional skepticism (Figure 1).  The model is 
recursive in that evidence is both an input (Link 2) and output (Link 11) of auditor decision 
processing whereby the output evidence becomes part of the auditor’s experience (Link 12) and 
                                               
4
 The motivated reasoning literature examines how individuals’ directional or accuracy goals affect their decision 
processes and resulting judgments (Kunda 1990).  Motivated reasoning, which need not be conscious, increases the 
likelihood of individuals arriving at preferred conclusions while maintaining a semblance of rationality and 
justifiability (i.e., an “illusion of objectivity”).  
5
 With respect to motivational biases, auditors, to varying degrees, adopt client preferences (McMillan and White 
1993; Glover, Prawitt and Wilks 2005) and exploit ambiguity to justify them (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; 
Salterio and Koonce 1997; Kadous et al. 2003).  See Smith and Kida (1991) for a discussion of auditor proneness to 
judgmental biases and Kennedy (1995) for debiasing methods. 
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future input evidence into subsequent decision processing (Link 13).  Skeptical judgments relate 
to the auditor’s cognition and state of mind (e.g., hypothesis generation and probability 
judgment) while skeptical actions are an attribute of auditor performance (e.g., planning 
decisions, disposition of audit differences, audit reporting).6  The judgment-action distinction is 
important as skeptical judgments do not always translate into skeptical actions (Link 1; Shaub 
and Lawrence 1996).  In addition to evidence, the model includes three determinants of skeptical 
judgments (Links 3-5) and actions (Links 8-10): knowledge, traits, and incentives.7 
Knowledge is a product of traits (Link 6) and audit experience (Link 7) and includes 
knowledge of evidential patterns and frequencies of non-misstatement and misstatement 
explanations (cf., Libby and Luft 1993). Knowledge can promote skeptical judgments and 
actions due to heightened sensitivity to risk factors (Low 2004) and more complete problem 
representations enabling auditors to better identify partial cue patterns suggestive of 
misstatement, assess higher likelihoods of material misstatement (in the presence of a seeded 
misstatement), and plan audit procedures that are better able to discriminate whether such a 
misstatement exists (Hammersley 2006).   However, knowledge may also hinder skeptical 
judgments and actions if it leads auditors to assume high frequency non-misstatement 
explanations are correct and missing information is consistent with non-misstatement 
explanations.  As discussed in Chapter 3, knowledge also may hinder professional skepticism, in 
the form of self-criticism, due to increased automaticity of decision processing. 
                                               
6
 Nelson (2009) uses the term skeptical judgments to describe professional judgments that reflect professional 
skepticism.  I use the more general professional judgment terminology. 
7
 Although not specifically modeled in Figure 1, Nelson acknowledges the possibility of interactive effects of the 
determinants on skeptical judgments and actions.  For example, auditors’ response to incentives is thought to depend 
upon their ethical development / moral reasoning (i.e., traits; see Jones, Massey and Thorne 2003 for a review). As 
another example, Johnstone, Bedard and Biggs (2002) provide evidence of an interaction between litigation risk (i.e., 
incentives) and knowledge in the generation of financial reporting alternatives.  My integrated framework will help 
guide future research on other potential interactions.   
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Traits are non-knowledge auditor attributes that are usually considered fixed once the 
auditor commences audit experience and training (see Brewster (2009) for a notable exception).  
Nelson (2009) divides traits into three categories: problem-solving ability, ethical/moral 
reasoning, and dispositional skepticism (e.g., Hurtt 2009).  Problem-solving ability can increase 
skeptical judgments and actions as raw intelligence helps auditors identify potential 
misstatements (e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990).  Higher (lower) ethical/moral reasoning increases 
(decreases) skeptical judgments and actions via heightened (lower) sensitivity to evidence about 
client competence, integrity, and potential inappropriate behavior (see Jones et al. (2003) for a 
review).  Auditors also differ in their general disposition towards skeptical judgments and actions 
(Quadackers, Groot and Wright 2008; Hurtt 2009).   
Auditors balance a multitude of countervailing skepticism-related incentives that may be 
direct or indirect, immediate or probabilistic, and financial or social (Nelson 2009).  Examples of 
incentives that promote skeptical judgments and actions include regulation, litigation, and 
reputation loss.  Examples of incentives that hinder skeptical judgments and actions include 
client satisfaction/retention concerns and budget/fee pressures.  Supervisor preferences, the 
social incentive used in this dissertation, can promote professional skepticism by invoking 
accountability if subordinates 1) realize the possibility of their own judgments being biased or 2) 
perceive such preferences to be diagnostic of increased risk of misstatement.  On the other hand, 
supervisor preferences could threaten subordinates’ self-concept or self-esteem leading to active 
justification of current judgments (i.e., defensive bolstering; Fisher, Nadler and Whitcher-Alagna 
1982; Nadler and Fisher 1986; Deelstra et al. 2003).8  For instance, some auditors may interpret 
supervisor skeptical preferences as questioning their objectivity, competence, or professionalism.   
                                               
8
 Supervisor preferences can also induce pressures to conform or be perceived as diagnostic of decreased risk of 
misstatement.  For example, Peecher (1996) provides evidence that lax supervisor preferences led to increased 
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2.3 A Dual-Process Representation of Professional Judgment  
Although research supports Nelson’s (2009) inclusion of these determinants (knowledge, 
traits, and incentives), little is known about the underlying cognition they invoke in producing 
professional judgments.  In this section, I present an integrated framework (See Figure 2) 
whereby Nelson’s (2009) determinants, when combined with audit evidence, affect auditors’ 
dual-processing (Smith and DeCoster 2000; Evans 2008).   Dual-processing not only directly 
influences the targets of auditors’ professional skepticism (evidence or their own judgment and 
decision making), but also moderates the extent to which determinants shift these targets.  Before 
elaborating on these effects, I briefly review research on dual-process models. 
Psychologists have used dual-process models to explain a wide array of phenomena 
including persuasion, attitudinal access, interpersonal perception, attributional inference, social 
judgment, and stereotyping (see Smith and DeCoster (2000) and Evans (2008) for reviews).  
These models distinguish between two modes of cognitive processing: automatic and controlled 
(e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin 1977). 9   Individuals use both modes simultaneously with 
(automatic) controlled processing being (fast, effortless, involuntary, and non-conscious) slow, 
effortful, voluntary, and conscious (Evans 2008).  The relative use of each mode is thought to 
depend on an individual’s cognitive capacity and motivation (Smith and DeCoster 2000). 10  If 
                                                                                                                                                       
likelihood assessments of client explanations (i.e., decreased professional skepticism). Auditors may also perceive 
supervisor preferences as an accuracy goal resulting in increased cognitive effort devoted to justifying their 
preexisting directional goals (Kadous, Kennedy and Peecher 2003).   
9
 There are several dual-process models in psychology used to explain diverse phenomena resulting in different 
labels and slight variations in substance (e.g., heuristic vs. systematic (Chen and Chaiken 1999), system 1 vs. system 
2 (Evans 2008), experiential vs. rational (Epstein 1994)).  I am not testing, however, whether auditors follow a 
specific dual-process model, but simply arguing that Nelson’s (2009) determinants affect where auditors fall on the 
dual-process continuum.  As the two general process labels, automatic and controlled, apply to most dual-process 
models and are relatively easy to understand (Moore and Loewenstein 2004), I use these labels in my integrated 
framework. 
10
 In Figure 2, the y-axis represents the composition of audit processing as the relative use of controlled and 
automatic processing with the extent of each type of processing depending on Nelson’s (2009) determinants.  Evans 
(2008) discusses how models differ in their representation of the simultaneous nature of dual processing.  Parallel-
competitive models assume that both processing modes truly occur simultaneously but vary in extent.  Default-
 10 
cognitive capacity is constrained (unconstrained), individuals rely on automatic (controlled) 
processing (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999).  Motivation to engage in more effortful, controlled 
processing differs based on individual, task, and environmental factors.  
Where auditors reside on the dual-process continuum has implications for where they 
target their professional skepticism.  As automatic processing often operates outside of conscious 
awareness (Chartrand and Bargh 1996; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Bargh et al. 2001), 
individuals have difficulty reflecting upon automatic judgments (Gilbert, Krull and Pelham 
1988a; Gilbert et al. 1988b; Gilbert, Krull and Malone 1990).  Consequently, auditors are less 
likely to direct professional skepticism towards their automatic decision processing than towards 
their controlled processing, especially as preemptive self-criticism is associated with conscious, 
effortful processing (e.g., Tetlock et al. 1989).  Nonetheless, as automatic processes are most 
common for habitual, repetitive, and rehearsed behaviors (Logan 1988; Gobet and Simon 1996; 
Sloman 1996), individuals gain confidence in their intuitive and efficient automatic processing.  
As a result, auditors’ automatic processing leads to proficiency in evaluating evidence. 
As controlled processing is more conscious, effortful and deliberate than automatic 
processing, individuals have better self-insight into the former (Gilbert et al. 1988a; Gilbert et al. 
1988b; Gilbert et al. 1990).  In addition, controlled processing promotes counterfactual thinking 
and consideration of alternative explanations whereby auditors may consider potential judgment 
errors including management fraud (Koonce 1992; Clark 1997).   As controlled processing is 
most common for non-routine tasks, auditors tend to be conservative when auditing outside of 
their domain expertise (Taylor 2000).  Essentially, the unfamiliarity of the task is a cue that 
                                                                                                                                                       
interventionist models assume that automatic processing is the default mode with controlled processing serving a 
supervisory / endorsement role over automatic processing with individuals repeatedly switching being the two 
processing modes.  My theory about the extent of each processing mode depending on Nelson’s determinants holds 
under both classes of dual-process models. 
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established routines may be ineffective and more deliberate analysis would likely be beneficial.  
Cumulatively, these factors indicate that auditors’ controlled processing is likely associated with 
a relatively higher level of professional skepticism towards both audit evidence and their 
judgment and decision making. 
I posit that audit evidence, knowledge, traits, and incentives influence where auditors 
reside on the dual-process continuum (See Figure 2).  As automatic processing is most common 
for habitual, repetitive, and rehearsed behaviors, knowledge (e.g., industry specialization) 
promotes automaticity.  Anderson’s (1983, 1987) theory of Adapted Control of Thought (ACT*) 
helps illustrate this relationship between knowledge and automaticity (Anderson 1992).  His 
theory describes how knowledge is initially stored in declarative form (e.g., you must use a key 
to start a car), but with experience becomes a largely unconscious, automatic production rule. 
Likewise, automatic (controlled) processing is more likely for frequently (infrequently) 
encountered patterns of evidence such as the lack (presence) of fraud risk indicators (Ashton 
1991).  Traits may well be associated with controlled (automatic) automatic processing such as 
having a high (low) skeptical disposition as skeptical individuals tend to expand their 
information search and delay judgment (Hurtt 2009).  Finally, incentives such as high (low) 
litigation risk can lead to more controlled (automatic) processing as auditors use controlled 
processing to guard against audit failure on high litigation risk clients.  In the next chapter, I 
describe how the efficacy of a social incentive, supervisor preferences emphasizing different 
skepticism targets (evidence or auditors’ own judgment and decision making), in influencing 
subordinates’ self-critical professional judgments depends on where auditors lie on the dual-
process continuum. 
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter, I use my integrated framework to predict that 1) specialization inhibits 
self-critical thinking and 2) the effects of priming auditors to direct their skepticism towards 
evidence or their judgment and decision making depends on where they reside, as a result of 
their specialization, on the dual-process continuum.  Priming specialists to target their judgment 
and decision making significantly shifts their position on the continuum towards more deliberate, 
self-critical processing.  This shift suggests an interaction of specialization and the target of 
auditors’ skepticism (evidence or their own judgment and decision making; manipulated via 
supervisor preferences) on their self-critical professional judgments. Specifically, I predict 
judgment-skepticism-condition specialists to exhibit the largest increase in self-critical 
professional judgments (compared to unprimed self-critical professional judgments) compared to 
the increases of evidence-skepticism-condition specialists and non-specialists subject to either 
prime. 
3.1 Industry Specialization and Self-Critical Thinking 
 
Public accounting firms designate auditors as industry specialists when they focus (i.e., 
specialize) in audits of the financial statements of firms in a particular industry.  Although the 
designation officially recognizes the auditor as an industry specialist, it is the knowledge 
acquired from experiences auditing firms in a particular industry that truly makes the auditor a 
specialist (Libby 1995; Solomon, Shields and Whittington 1999). 11   Specialists acquire 
knowledge through experience from both indirect (e.g., firm training) and direct (e.g., working 
on industry audit engagements) sources including how macro-economic forces and industry 
trends potentially explain fluctuations in account balances (Solomon et al. 1999).   
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 I could use the industry-specific experience or industry specialization terminology interchangeably without 
affecting my predictions or inferences from my results.  The amount of industry-specific experience required for the 
industry specialist designation is unspecified by the firms or prior research.   
 13 
Specialization has numerous audit quality benefits.  It improves auditors’ performance in 
misstatement hypothesis generation and analytical procedures leading to superior performance in 
misstatement detection (e.g., Bedard and Biggs 1991; Johnson, Jamal and Berryman 1991; 
Wright and Wright 1997).  Specialization also leads to heightened sensitivity to risk factors (Low 
2004) and more complete problem representations enabling auditors to better identify partial cue 
patterns suggestive of misstatement, assess higher likelihoods of material misstatement (in the 
presence of a seeded misstatement), and plan audit procedures that are better able to discriminate 
whether such a misstatement exists (Hammersley 2006).  
In light of my integrated framework, these benefits indicate that specialization relates 
more to improving auditors’ interpretation and assimilation of domain evidence than enhancing 
reflective, self-critical thinking.  That is, there are several cognitive and motivational factors that 
make specialists less apt to be self-critical than non-specialists.  Specialization increases 
automaticity of decision processing as automatic processes are most common for habitual, 
repetitive, and rehearsed behaviors (Logan 1988; Gobet and Simon 1996; Sloman 1996).  Within 
Anderson’s (1983, 1987) ACT* model, auditors’ declarative knowledge (e.g., potential 
explanations for unexpected fluctuations in account balances) becomes more proceduralized (i.e., 
automatic).  Likewise, specialization increases auditors’ confidence in their ability to assimilate 
evidence into risk assessments (Taylor 2000) coupled with pressures to appear knowledgeable 
and decisive.12 
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 Taylor’s (2000) result builds on psychology literature documenting knowledge as an important determinant of 
confidence (Ellsberg  1961; Frisch and Baron 1988). In fact, recognized experts tend to be overconfident (e.g., 
Fischhoff et al. 1988; Zacharias and Shepherd 2001; Malmendier and Tate 2005).  Overconfidence occurs when 
individuals overestimate their knowledge or ability versus a normative benchmark and has behavioral consequences 
such as elevating the perceived informativeness of confirmatory evidence (e.g., Swann and Giuliano 1987; Klayman 
et al. 1999).  Although less confident, novices are often more overconfident than experts (Kruger and Dunning 
1999).  The theory underlying my hypotheses only requires that specialists are more confident than non-specialists. 
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As automatic processing often operates outside of conscious awareness (Chartrand and 
Bargh 1996; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Bargh et al. 2001), auditors are less likely to reflect 
upon automatic judgments.  Automatic judgments are typically the first on the scene and have 
powerful effects on controlled processes such as informational retrieval from memory and 
evidence evaluation (Bargh 1989; Epstein et al. 1992; Most et al. 2001).  Specialization-induced 
automaticity also leads to a higher degree of unconscious certainty (Elliott, Dolan and Frith 
2000; Burton 2008).  With experience, neural linkages strengthen and become increasingly 
difficult to consciously override (LeDoux, Romanski and Xagoraris 1991; Elliott et al. 2000).  
These strengthened linkages likely lead specialists to become unconsciously certain that 
particular explanations are correct.  If auditors are unconsciously certain, they are less likely to 
consciously consider their judgment fallibility. 
Specialization-induced automaticity is especially likely in the absence of fraud risk 
indicators as automatic processes are triggered by activation of previously learned associations 
(Fiske 1998) and auditors have limited first-hand experience with (especially fraud-related) 
misstatements (Ashton 1991; Solomon et al. 1999). Non-specialists, on the other hand, are likely 
to use more controlled processing due to industry familiarity.  As non-specialists are less 
confident and more conservative (Taylor 2000), such processing is likely more deliberate and 
self-critical.  Cumulatively, in the absence of fraud risk indicators, these factors make specialists 
less likely to worry about their judgments that were based on their interpretations of evidence 
including the possibility of unknown misstatement explanations and well-concealed fraud (i.e., 
not overtly indicated by the evidence).   
H1: In the absence of fraud risk indicators, industry specialists’ unprimed professional 
judgments will be less self-critical than non-specialists’ unprimed professional judgments.  
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3.2 Targets of Professional Skepticism 
In H1, I predict that specialists’ professional judgments will be less self-critical than 
those of non-specialists due to specialists’ intuitive, automatic decision processing and 
confidence in their ability to interpret evidence.  In this section, I examine how to promote self-
criticism by shifting the target of auditor skepticism.  My integrated framework specifies that the 
efficacy of priming evidence and judgment skepticism in promoting self-critical professional 
judgments depends on where (unprimed) auditors otherwise reside on the dual-process 
continuum. 
3.2.1 Evidence Skepticism 
I use supervisor preferences as my manipulation of the target of professional 
skepticism. 13   Previous research has not documented consistent benefits of supervisors 
emphasizing audit evidence as the target of auditors’ skepticism nor examined its potential 
interactive relationship with industry specialization.  For example, Peecher (1996) examined 
auditors’ likelihood assessments of client explanations and generation of alternative explanations 
for an unexpected fluctuation in preliminary analytical review conditional on their supervisors 
emphasizing being skeptical of evidence, objective, or fully utilizing the client’s insight.  He 
observed no difference in professional judgments of objective-condition auditors and skeptical-
condition auditors. Brown, Peecher and Solomon (1999) found that auditors asked to be skeptical 
of evidence evaluated its expected diagnosticity such that they were prone to disconfirm client 
management’s explanations (i.e., disconfirmation proneness), but these same auditors were also 
prone to overestimate the value of evidence even when its expected diagnosticity was zero (i.e., 
                                               
13
 Supervisor preferences are essentially an accountability manipulation but the purpose is not to examine how 
auditors respond to complex systems of multiple accountabilities (see Gibbins and Newton (1994) for a review).  
The primary purpose is to use a strong and direct method of manipulating the target of auditors’ professional 
skepticism.  
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information proneness).  If auditors fail to discriminate diagnostic from non-diagnostic evidence, 
their belief revision and professional judgment are impaired, potentially to a degree that 
comprises audit effectiveness and outweighs any audit effectiveness benefits of being prone to 
disconfirm client management’s explanations.  Carpenter and Reimers (2009) found that auditors 
elevate fraud risk assessments in response to evidence skepticism preferences, but only in the 
presence of overt fraud risk indicators.14   
 My integrated framework predicts that evidence skepticism preferences will not alter the 
dual-processing of neither specialists nor non-specialists.  As previously discussed, non-
specialists are likely to use controlled processing (i.e., deliberate, conscious, self-critical).  And, 
as industry unfamiliarity elevates the risk of misinterpreting evidence, non-specialists likely 
direct a relatively higher degree of skepticism towards evidence, irrespective (i.e., whether 
primed or not) of evidence skepticism preferences.   
 Specialists’ judgments, though, tend to be more automatic (i.e., effortless, non-conscious, 
intuitive) thereby reducing the likelihood that they will adjust their decision processing in 
response to evidence skepticism preferences.  As specialization-induced automaticity is often 
non-conscious (e.g., Bargh et al. 2001), highly confident specialists are less likely to be 
preemptively self-critical of automatic judgments and may even experience unconscious 
certainty whereby they are unconsciously certain that a particular explanation is correct (Elliott 
et al. 2000; Burton 2008).  In addition, specialists face pressures to have and are confident in 
their proficiency in evidence evaluation (Taylor 2000).  That is, specialists are confident in their 
ability to evaluate and assimilate evidence likely resulting in a perception that there are limited, 
                                               
14
 Concluding that evidence skepticism preferences improve auditors’ ability to detect fraud, based on these results, 
is tenuous for two reasons.   One, fraud is most likely to go undetected in the absence of fraud risk indicators (Bell et 
al. 2005; Trotman 2006).  Two, the authors did not use specialists who are more likely to recognize patterns 
indicative of misstatement irrespective of supervisor preferences (Hammersley 2006) and whom I predict to be 
unlikely to elevate skepticism in response to evidence skepticism preferences.  
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if any, benefits to elevating evidence skepticism, especially given the lack of overt fraud risk 
indicators.  Therefore, asking specialists to question their processing of evidence is unlikely to 
invoke more controlled processing or self-criticism on a seemingly, routine analytical review 
task. 
3.2.2 Judgment Skepticism 
Unlike (like) evidence skepticism preferences, judgment skepticism preferences likely 
alter specialists’ (do not alter non-specialists’) position on the dual-process continuum.  As 
previously discussed, non-specialists are likely to use controlled processing (i.e., deliberate, 
conscious, self-critical).  And, as industry unfamiliarity elevates the risk of making incorrect 
judgments, non-specialists likely direct a relatively higher degree of skepticism towards their 
judgment and decision making, irrespective of judgment skepticism preferences.  They realize 
they are working in an unfamiliar industry and, thus, actively consider what they do not know 
such as unknown misstatements and well-concealed fraud. 
As previously discussed, evidence skepticism preferences are unlikely to alter specialists’ 
decision processing due to relatively high automaticity and judgment confidence.  By shifting the 
skepticism target to the auditor’s judgment and decision making, however, judgment skepticism 
preferences attack auditors’ confidence by highlighting common expert judgment errors and 
urging them to consider the fallibility of their judgments.  For example, judgment skepticism 
preferences might emphasize how experts are notoriously overconfident (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein 1988; Zacharias and Shepherd 2001; Malmendier and Tate 2005).  Similarly, 
judgment skepticism preferences imply that part of being a consummate professional is 
questioning one’s judgment and decision making (Campbell and Hughes 2005).  Cumulatively, 
judgment skepticism preferences activate the possibility of unknown explanations in specialists’ 
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working memory (Thomas et al. 2008).  Activation of unknown explanations in working 
memory serves as both a motivation and cue for the auditor to be self-critical, consistent with 
preemptive self-criticism being most likely when dealing with the unknown (Tetlock et al. 1989).  
The activation cues auditors that their judgments may be fallible and motivates them to alter their 
decision processing to guard against audit failure.   
The resulting increase in controlled processing likely will lead auditors to respond by 
considering what they do not know in an epistemological sense and increase the probability they 
assign to unknown misstatement explanations.  Essentially, auditors are assessing the probability 
of potential misstatement explanations of which they are unaware.  In the absence of overt fraud 
risk indicators, this processing likely results in auditors recognizing the possibility of well-
concealed fraud. 
 In summary, neither evidence skepticism nor judgment skepticism preferences are likely 
to alter non-specialists’ position on the dual-process continuum due to controlled processing 
triggered by industry unfamiliarity.  However, judgment skepticism preferences are relatively 
more likely than evidence skepticism preferences to alter specialists’ position on the dual-process 
continuum. Judgment skepticism preferences serve as a motivation and cue to be self-critical of 
their otherwise intuitive, automatic decision processing to account for potential judgment errors 
such as misstatement explanations not indicated by the evidence.  Such consideration includes 
failure to sufficiently consider well-concealed fraud, a potential, very serious judgment error. 
 
H2: In the absence of fraud risk indicators, the difference between primed and unprimed 
auditors' self-critical professional judgments will be greatest when specialists are primed to 
question their own judgment and decision making, compared to audit evidence, and compared to 
when non-specialists are primed to question either their own judgment and decision making or 
audit evidence. 
 
See Figure 3 for graphical representation of H2. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD 
I employ a 2 x 3 (one measured factor and one manipulated factor) between-participants 
experimental design where practicing auditors complete a preliminary analytical review task for 
a property and casualty insurance client (see Appendix A for the experimental materials).  
Participants generate explanations for an unexpected ratio fluctuation, assign probabilities to 
these and unknown explanations, and assess the aggregate risk of material misstatement.  I use a 
partial match-mismatch design (Low 2004) considering auditors specializing within insurance to 
be specialists and auditors specializing in all other industries to be non-specialists. 15   To 
manipulate the target of auditor skepticism, I use supervisor preferences with the skepticism 
emphasis predominantly being on either audit evidence (evidence skepticism; hereafter ES) or on 
the auditor’s own judgment and decision making (judgment skepticism; hereafter JS) along with 
a control condition.    
4.1 Participants  
I employ two data collection methods (internet and paper-based) and donate $5 to a 
charity selected by each participant.16   Three-hundred seventy one practicing auditors, from 
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 A complete match-mismatch design (e.g., Solomon et al. 1999; Hammersley 2006) entails two groups of 
specialists completing two industry-specific audit tasks in a within-participants manipulation resulting in a matched 
and mismatched observation for each participant.  I use a partial match-mismatch design to increase the number of 
auditors qualifying to participate in my study and to keep the experiment at a reasonable length.  Using a complete 
match-mismatch design would increase power as each group acts as their own control and avoid the correlated 
omitted variables problem associated with measured variables.  I control for non-specialists’ insurance and closely 
related industry experience to address correlated omitted variables. 
16
 As online recruiting efforts heavily targeted insurance industry specialists, there is significantly higher rate of such 
specialists in the internet responses (Internet = 47.5%; Paper = 15.4%; χ21 = 20.75; p two-tailed < 0.001).  As only 
seniors attended the firm training sessions, the internet sample has more experienced auditors (Internet = 8.0 years; 
Paper = 3.7 years; t169= 5.87; p two-tailed < 0.001).  Consequently, a concern is that paper-based respondents are, in 
general, more deliberate and self-critical than internet-respondents rather than due to non-specialists’ industry 
unfamiliarity.  This possibility is unlikely as internet respondents devote more time to the task (2.5 minutes or 14% 
longer; ptwo-tailed = 0.007) and generate 1.36 additional self-generated explanations (ptwo-tailed < 0.001).  I also control 
for response mode, general experience, and closely-related industry experience in all analyses and am unaware of 
any other theory suggesting that these differences would interact with any of my independent variables.   In addition, 
research has found internet and paper-based results to be similar (Birnbaum 2000).  Cumulatively, these factors 
indicate that response mode does not threaten the construct validity of the Specialization measured variable. 
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multiple experience levels, were invited to participate online by two partners at Big 4 firms, two 
senior managers at large regional firms, and myself.17   Eighty auditors completed the online 
materials resulting in an internet response rate of 21.6%.  Ninety-one senior-level auditors 
participated during a firm training session.  Thus, the final sample included 171 auditors with an 
average of 5.7 years of experience.18   See Table 1 for demographic information about the sample.  
Audit seniors and more experienced auditors are appropriate participants as beginning at this 
level, auditors are responsible for performing preliminary analytical review procedures (Hirst 
and Koonce 1996).   
4.2 Experimental Task 
 
The experiment begins with background information including the client’s internal 
control system, business objectives, key risks, and industry trends as recommended by Asare and 
Wright (2001) for analytical procedure research.   I chose not seed a misstatement or include 
overt fraud risk factors to operationalize a well-concealed fraud.19    A context devoid of fraud 
risk indicators is beneficial as it likely promotes automaticity and confidence in specialists’ 
decision processing thereby allowing the strongest test of my theory by maximizing between-
group variance.  From a practical standpoint, regulators have made allegations of pervasive 
insufficient professional skepticism (PCAOB 2007).  As auditors rarely encounter fraud (Ashton 
1991), this setting represents the environment that auditors typically operate within.  That is, we 
should clearly be concerned with conditions where fraud is not overtly indicated especially as 1) 
fraud is most likely to undetected when management goes to elaborate lengths to deceive (Bell et 
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 The auditors who sent out the recruiting emails required firm and auditor anonymity leaving me unable to test for 
firm effects.  Controlling for firm size does not affect any of the results reported herein. 
18
 Six (twenty-three) auditors started but did not complete the paper-based (internet) version of the experiment.  The 
rate was not significantly different based on experimental condition (ES = 13.6%; JS = 20.5%; Control = 18.2%; χ22 
= 1.53; ptwo-tailed = 0.465).    
19
 A partner specializing in insurance at a Big 4 accounting firm reviewed the case materials concluded them to be 
representative of practice and that there are no overt fraud risk indicators.  
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al. 2005) and 2) specialists have been shown to have some superiority in identifying partial cue 
patterns suggestive of fraud (Hammersley 2006).   
Based on random assignment, participants then encounter one of the three levels of the 
Skepticism Target manipulation (wording to appear hereafter).  Participants then read about an 
unexpected fluctuation in the unaudited deferred policy acquisition cost balance.  Deferred 
policy acquisition costs relate to the acquisition of policies (e.g., agent commissions) and are 
capitalized and amortized over the policy’s life. I chose this rather basic industry-specific 
account to promote automaticity and confidence in specialists’ decision processing.  Using a 
basic industry-specific account also increases the likelihood of non-specialists with limited 
insurance industry experience being familiar with the account.  Therefore, I measure and control 
for non-specialists’ insurance and closely-related industry experience. 
The unexpected fluctuation is accompanied by a management-provided non-misstatement 
explanation (increase in commission rates) as typically occurs in practice (Hirst and Koonce 
1996).  Participants assess the probability that this explanation accounts for substantially all of 
the observed fluctuation.  Next, participants generate potential explanations and assess the 
associated probabilities.  The participants then separately assess the probabilities that unknown 
misstatement and non-misstatement explanations account for substantially all of the observed 
fluctuation followed by their risk assessments and assessment of judgment confidence.  The 
experiment concludes with a post-experimental questionnaire including measurement of control 
variables and demographic questions.    
4.3 Independent Variables 
I consider auditors specializing in the insurance industry to be specialists and auditors 
specializing in other industries to be non-specialists while controlling for the latter’s experience 
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auditing clients in insurance and closely related industries (Low 2004).20  Although the vast 
majority of audits are currently being performed by specialists (Hammersley 2006), the inclusion 
of non-specialists is essential for testing my theory on how specialization and targets of 
professional skepticism jointly affect auditors’ professional judgments.  
For Skepticism Target, I manipulate the degree to which the engagement partner 
emphasized ES or JS.  See Appendix A for the ES and JS manipulations.  For ES, note the 
partner discusses how auditors often fail to exercise sufficient evidence skepticism and provided 
examples.  For JS, the passage is identical to ES except that I change the partners’ emphasis to 
judgment skepticism.  This passage attacks confidence by discussing how experts in other fields 
tend to be overconfident and providing common expert errors.   
In both of these conditions, I ask participants to recall an instance where they failed to 
exercise sufficient professional skepticism.  They also answer two multiple-choice questions that 
both strengthen and verify attention to the manipulation.  One question distinguishes either ES or 
JS from an accuracy goal to minimize defensive reactions (i.e., Kadous et al. 2003).  The other 
question verifies their understanding of the linkage between either ES or JS and audit 
effectiveness.  Control group participants do not read either passage, nor answer any questions, 
and simply proceed to the preliminary analytical review section of the experiment. 
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 Participants reported their industry specializations along with the percentage of their work year spent on insurance, 
other financial services, and clients in other industries.  I identified 7 participants who spend a significant amount of 
time on insurance clients (>25%) but reported no or another industry specialization and 2 participants who spend 
very little time on insurance clients (<25%) but reported an insurance industry specialization.  I reclassified these 9 
participants in the results reported herein.  Inferences are unchanged using their reported industry specialization or 
omitting these observations.  I interviewed a Big 4 audit partner who stated that he would consider an auditor that 
spends over 25% of their time within an industry to be a specialist.  This 25% cutoff also minimizes the number of 
reclassified participants. 
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4.4 Dependent Variables  
Participants generate explanations for the unexpected ratio fluctuation and assign 
probabilities (using a 0 – 100 probability scale).21   To test my hypotheses, I use three variables 
that represent professional judgments that reflect self-criticism: 1) the probability assigned to 
unknown misstatement explanations and 2-3) the number of and probability assigned to fraud 
explanations. These variables are consistent with 1) academics and regulators viewing attention 
to misstatement explanations as an indication of having exercised professional skepticism 
(AICPA 2003; Nelson 2009) and 2) professional skepticism being increasingly linked to 
prevention and detection of fraud (Bell et al. 2005).  As supplemental analysis, I also measure the 
number of and probabilities assigned to error and non-misstatement explanations, probabilities 
assigned to unknown non-misstatement explanations, and aggregate risk assessments.22   
In the absence of fraud risk indicators, generating fraud explanations is important for 
several reasons.  One, explicit consideration of management fraud increases the justifiability of 
auditors’ beliefs which is vital in the absence of a normative benchmark such as evaluating audit 
quality in the absence of an alleged misstatement (Bell et al. 2005).  Two, fraud is most likely to 
go undetected when management goes to elaborate lengths to deceive (Bell et al. 2005).  Three, 
medical research indicates the value of having a diagnostic hypothesis (e.g., fraud) in one’s 
initial hypothesis set in terms of evidence gathering (e.g., identifying subsequent fraud risk 
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 A professor with six years of auditing experience and I (three years of auditing experience including numerous 
property and casualty insurance clients) coded, while blind to experimental conditions, the explanations as non-
misstatement, fraud, or error explanations. Out of 465 total explanations, we agreed on 421 explanations resulting in 
an inter-rater agreement of 90.5% and a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.901 (p < 0.001). We mutually resolved all differences.     
22
 Professional standards typically describe professional skepticism in terms of fraud (e.g., see excerpt from SAS No. 
99 in Chapter 2). Even if I consider attention to errors to be professional skepticism, my theory is less applicable as 
specialists likely consider high frequency errors irrespective of a prime (Owhoso, Messier and Lynch 2002).   
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indicators) and diagnostic performance (Barrows et al. 1982). 23   Four, generating fraud 
explanations can improve audit planning decisions (Hunton and Gold 2009).   
4.5 Control Variables  
My control variables relate to 1) other professional skepticism determinants to control for 
potential differences within the industry specialization measured variable and 2) auditor decision 
processing.  With respect to Nelson’s (2009) determinants, I control knowledge, audit-experience 
and training, and traits.  For knowledge, I control non-specialists’ insurance and closely related 
industry experience by adding the percent of their work year spent on property and casualty 
insurance, life and health insurance, and other financial services clients and multiplying the total 
by an industry specialization dummy variable set to 1 for non-specialists (Specialization).  For 
audit experience and training, I measure the participants’ years in the auditing profession.  As 
material misstatements may be more likely or publicized within particular industries, I measure 
the perceived frequency of material misstatements within all participants’ reported industry 
specialization.  As a general confidence measure (i.e., outside of experimental task or a trait), I 
ask participants to assess their knowledge relative to auditors with the same rank within their 
industry specialization. 
I measure and control for aspects of the participants’ decision processes to assess whether 
Skepticism Target is operating consistent with the theory underlying the hypotheses.  Four 
measures in this category are reported by all participants: 1) their judgment confidence 
(Confidence), 2) consideration of judgment fallibility (Judgment Fallibility), 3) consideration of 
overconfidence (Overconfidence), and 4) time spent on the task (Time).24  I collect two other 
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 Using an ill-structured audit task allows me to make inferences about likely benefits in terms of justifiability (Bell 
et al. 2005) and downstream benefits (Barrows et al. 1982), but precludes me from making normative statements 
about improved performance or the reduction of bias.  
24
 Judgment Fallibility and Overconfidence also serve as manipulation checks. 
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measures only in the two Skepticism Target conditions (ES and JS): 1) perception of Skepticism 
Target as an accuracy goal (Accuracy) and 2) the extent to which Skepticism Target made them 
defensive (Defensive). Finally, I control for the two modes of data collection using a dummy 
variable (Internet). 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
5.1 Manipulation Checks 
In both Skepticism Target conditions (ES and JS), participants describe an instance when 
they failed to exercise sufficient professional skepticism and answered two multiple choice 
questions (See Appendix A for these questions and Appendix B for sample responses to the 
open-ended question).  84.2% (86.8%) of the participants in the ES (JS) conditions provided 
written responses. 86.8% (87.5%) of the participants in the ES (JS) conditions answered both 
multiple choice questions correctly, indicating a successful Skepticism Target manipulation.25 
 Running ANCOVAs with the decision-processing variables as dependent variables also 
indicates a successful manipulation.  Consistent with JS invoking more controlled processing in 
specialists than ES, JS-condition specialists spent significantly more time on the task (21.1 
minutes) than ES-condition specialists (18.3 minutes; F1,164 = 2.03; pone-tailed = 0.073). JS-
condition auditors also significantly increase their consideration of judgment fallibility (JS = 
6.35; Control = 5.84; F1,164 = 2.73; pone-tailed = 0.050) and overconfidence (JS  = 4.99; Control = 
4.06; F1,163 = 2.73; pone-tailed = 0.033).  Meanwhile, ES-condition auditors do not significantly 
increase their consideration of judgment fallibility (ES = 6.08; F1,164 = 0.87; ptwo-tailed = 0.353) or 
overconfidence (ES = 4.75; F1,164 = 1.51; ptwo-tailed = 0.222) compared to Control-condition 
auditors.26 Although these four contrasts provide evidence of a successful JS manipulation, in the 
development of my hypotheses, I discuss how the largest effect (compared to Control) on these 
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 Excluding the participants who did not provide a written response and/or incorrectly answered the manipulation 
check questions does not qualitatively change any of the reported results.  The correct response rate for the multiple 
choice questions is statistically better than 50% in both the ES (χ2 = 28.70; p < 0.001) and JS (χ2 = 27.00; p < 0.001) 
conditions. 
26
 JS-condition specialists report a significantly higher level of Judgment Fallibility and Overconfidence compared 
to ES-condition and Control-condition specialists (Judgment Fallibility: F= 2.44; pone-tailed = 0.060; Overconfidence: 
F = 2.70; pone-tailed = 0.051), but not when compared to only ES-condition specialists (Judgment Fallibility: F= 0.80; 
pone-tailed = 0.187; Overconfidence: F = 0.67; pone-tailed = 0.208).  The lack of difference between ES and JS is likely to 
due to some ES-condition specialists perceiving their consideration of fraud (See H1 and H2 results) as judgment 
fallibility / overconfidence consideration, on a post test basis.   
 27 
two variables would be for JS-condition specialists.  To examine these differential effects, I used 
the following planned comparison: 
3*(JSS - Control S) - 1/3*(ES S – Control S + JS NS + ES NS – 2*Control NS) > 0                 (1) 
This contrast is significant for Judgment Fallibility (F1,163 = 2.079; pone-tailed = 0.075) but not 
Overconfidence (F1,164 = 1.63; p one-tailed = 0.101).27  As there were no differences in Accuracy or 
Defensive, the distinction between ES and JS primarily relates to time spent on the task (i.e., 
more controlled processing) and judgment fallibility consideration.28 
5.2 Unknown Misstatement Explanations 
For my first test of H1 and H2, I employ the probability that participants assigned to 
unknown misstatement explanations for the unexpected fluctuation in the DAC balance and ran 
an ANCOVA (Table 2). 29   Supporting H1, non-specialists assign a significantly higher 
probability to unknown misstatement explanations than specialists within the Control condition 
(Control NS = 1.04; Control S = 0.76; F1,163  = 3.26; pone-tailed = 0.036).  See Figure 4 Panels A and 
B for graphical representation of results. 
To test my prediction in H2 that the increase (compared to Control) in the probability of 
unknown misstatement explanations would be highest for JS-condition specialists compared to 
the increases of ES-condition specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and JS-condition non-
specialists, I used the planned contrast (1) within the ANCOVA. 
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 Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, superscripts of S(NS) refer to specialists (non-specialists). 
28
 To further investigate the ES and JS distinction, a professor with two years of auditing experience and I (3 years 
of auditing experience) coded the open-ended responses as primarily ES or JS instances while blind to experimental 
conditions.  Out of 94 total responses, 20 responses were too general to code resulting in 74 codable responses.  We 
agreed on 61 explanations resulting in an inter-rater agreement of 82.4% and a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.649 (p < 0.001). 
We mutually resolved all differences.    The correct coding rate of 89.2% (66 out of 74) is statistically better than 
50% (χ2 = 45.46; p < 0.001) indicating a successful manipulation between ES and JS. 
29
 Participants separately reported the probabilities that the fluctuation was due to a) an unknown misstatement 
explanation, b) a combination of misstatement explanations, and c) a combination of misstatement and non-
misstatement explanations.  I use the sum of these three probabilities in the analysis reported herein.  As categories 
b) and c) could be combinations of known and unknown explanations, I ran all analyses with only a) and a factor 
score (factor loadings: a): 0.788; b): 0.896; c) 0.643) and observe qualitatively similar results. 
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This contrast is significant (F1,163 = 4.09; pone-tailed = 0.022) supporting H2.30  I obtain 
further support for this interaction by comparing the simple main effects of each skepticism 
target to Control.  JS significantly increases specialists’ probability of unknown misstatement 
explanations compared to Control (JSS = 1.25; ControlS = 0.76; F1,163  = 6.44; pone-tailed = 0.006), 
an increase of 66% in percentage terms.  Similar contrasts compared to Control are insignificant 
for ES-condition specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and JS-condition non-specialists (all 
ptwo-tailed > 0.10).  A contrast using weights of +2 (JSS = 1.253), -1 (ES S = 0.987), and -1 
(ControlS = 0.755) indicates that JS-condition specialists also assess a higher probability of 
unknown misstatement explanations compared to specialists in the other two conditions (F1,163 = 
4.83; pone-tailed = 0.015).31  Cumulatively, H2 is supported with respect to unknown misstatements 
and consistent with only JS-condition specialists increasing the probability of unknown 
misstatement explanations as ES preferences do not alter specialists’ automatic processing and 
non-specialists assign a relatively high level to unknown misstatement explanations irrespective 
of supervisor preferences. 
5.3 Fraud Explanations  
As a second test of H1 and H2, I measure the number and probability of fraud 
explanations that participants generated for the unexpected fluctuation in the DAC balance and 
ran a factor analysis. The results indicate that both of these variables load on the same factor as 
only one eigenvalue is greater than 1.0 (eigenvalue = 1.77).  The factor loadings are presented in 
Table 3 Panel A.  Using the factor scores as a dependent variable, I ran an ANCOVA (Table 3 
Panel C).  Supporting H1, non-specialists’ Fraud Factor Score is significantly higher than 
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 A semi-omnibus test supports the assumption of equality of the differences compared to Control for ES-condition 
specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and JS-condition non-specialists (F1,163  = 0.85; ptwo-tailed = 0.349).  
31
 The contrast of ES-condition and JS-condition specialists is insignificant (ESS = 0.99; JSS = 1.25; F1,163  = 1.63; 
pone-tailed = 0.102), but is significant when removing the two covariates from the ANCOVA (F = 2.12; pone-tailed = 
0.073).   
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specialists within the Control condition (ControlNS = 0.03; ControlS = -0.33; F1,162  = 2.58; pone-
tailed = 0.055).  In fact, none of the 19 specialists in the Control condition generated a single fraud 
explanation.  See Figure 4 Panels C and D for graphical representation of results. 
To test my prediction in H2 that the increase (compared to Control) in fraud 
consideration would be highest for JS-condition specialists compared to the increases of ES-
condition specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and JS-condition non-specialists, I used the 
planned contrast (1) within the ANCOVA.  This contrast is insignificant (F1,162 = 1.30; pone-tailed = 
0.128) failing to support H2.32  The lack of support for this predicted interaction is clarified by 
comparing the simple main effects of each skepticism target to Control.  Consistent with H2, JS 
significantly increases specialists’ consideration of fraud compared to Control (JSS = 0.14; 
ControlS = -0.33; F1,162  = 2.94; pone-tailed = 0.044).  However, the significance of the interaction is 
dampened by a insignificant increase in ES-condition specialists’ consideration of fraud (ESS = 
0.06; ControlS = -0.33; F1,162  = 2.36; ptwo-tailed = 0.126). 33   This result is consistent with 
skepticism being increasingly linked to fraud (Bell et al. 2005) and encouraging as ES 
preferences lead some highly confident specialists to consider fraud even when not indicated by 
the evidence. 
The lack of support for H2 with respect to frauds is further clarified in a repeated measure 
ANCOVA using the raw data (i.e., number and probability of fraud explanations).  Within this 
ANCOVA (Table 4), the H2 contrast is significant for the number of fraud explanations (F1,162 = 
2.05, pone-tailed = 0.077), but not the probability of fraud explanations (F1,162  = 0.50; pone-tailed = 
0.240).  That is, JS-condition specialists are the most likely to increase consideration of fraud 
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 A semi-omnibus test supports the assumption of equality of the differences compared to Control of JS-condition 
non-specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and ES-condition specialists (F1,162  = 1.35; ptwo-tailed = 0.247).  
33
 Consistent with H2 and non-specialists considering fraud irrespective of supervisor preferences due to self-critical 
controlled processing triggered by industry unfamiliarity, neither type of supervisor preference increased non-
specialists’ consideration of fraud (all ptwo-tailed > 0.10).   
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explanations (compared to all other conditions), but not as likely to assign a high probability to 
these explanations.34  In the absence of fraud risk indicators, this pattern of results is arguably 
appropriate as, by definition, fraud is unlikely to be present.  Likewise, explicit consideration of 
fraud increases the justifiability of auditors’ beliefs.  It may also have benefits in audit planning 
(Hunton and Gold 2009) and execution such as superior identification of subsequently 
encountered fraud risk indicators.  With respect to fraud, H2 is partially supported with the 
results being stronger for the number than the probability of fraud explanations. 
5.4 Supplemental Analysis 
Further support for my framework and insight is gained through four supplemental 
analyses.  First, I examine other determinants of self-critical professional judgments.  Second, I 
use a mediation analysis to provide evidence that my dependent variables are capturing self-
criticism.  Third, I assess the quality of fraud explanations.  Fourth, I analyze participants’ other 
professional judgments. 
5.4.1 Other Determinants of Self-Critical Professional Judgments 
Collectively, the significant covariates identify other factors associated with self-critical 
professional judgments and lend further empirical support to my integrated framework.  Not 
surprisingly, participants’ perceived frequency of misstatements within their industry 
specialization (Misstatement Sensitivity) is positively associated with the probability of unknown 
misstatement explanations (ptwo-tailed = 0.023). Non-specialists’ insurance and closely-related 
industry experience is negatively associated with unknown misstatement explanations (ptwo-tailed = 
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 An alternative explanation for these results is that specialists have a larger repository of potential explanations 
than non-specialists.  Thus, non-specialists could increase self-criticism just as much as specialists, but the increase 
would not be evident in their generation of fraud explanations.  This explanation is unlikely for three reasons.  First, 
see Section 5.1 where I document that JS-condition specialists exhibit the largest increase in Judgment Fallibility.   
Second, non-specialists did not increase Judgment Fallibility or Overconfidence nor devote more time to task in 
response to either ES or JS primes (all ptwo-tailed > 0.10).  Third, I examine fraud explanations as a percentage of total 
explanations and find that the increase in this measure of self-criticism is largest for JS-condition specialists (F = 
2.12; pone-tailed = 0.074) suggesting that these specialists did not simply draw on a larger repository of explanations.    
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0.041) consistent my integrated framework where proximity to an industry elevates automaticity 
and confidence thereby decreasing the likelihood that auditors are self-critical.  
Consistent with my integrated framework, judgment fallibility consideration (Judgment 
Fallibility) is positively associated with fraud explanations (ptwo-tailed = 0.047).  Yet, unexpectedly, 
consideration of overconfidence (Overconfidence) is negatively associated with skepticism in 
terms of fraud explanations (ptwo-tailed = 0.001).  To further investigate this result, I calculated 
bivariate correlations of Overconfidence and Fraud Factor Score in each of the 6 experimental 
conditions.  The negative association is only significant for non-specialists in the ES and JS 
conditions.  As will be discussed below, non-specialists increase the probability of error 
explanations in response to both evidence skepticism and judgment skepticism preferences 
which appears to inhibit their consideration of well-concealed fraud.35   In the next section, I 
further investigate an unexpected finding, the lack of association between Judgment Fallibility 
and Unknown Misstatements.   
5.4.2 Mediation Analysis 
To provide further support for my theory that increased self-criticism (primed by 
judgment skepticism preferences) will lead specialists to increase the probability of unknown 
misstatement explanations, I employ a Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation analysis.  As my 
theory suggests that judgment skepticism preferences will only increase judgment fallibility 
consideration (i.e., self-criticism) for JS-condition specialists, I conduct the mediation analysis 
with only the Control-condition and JS-condition specialists’ data.  Within this small sample (n = 
                                               
35
 The only other significant covariate in Tables 2-3 is Internet (ptwo-tailed = 0.023) being positively associated with 
fraud consideration.  There is a reasonable effort-based explanation.  Recall that internet respondents devoted more 
effort to the task (see footnote 16).   If participants devote more cognitive effort to generating explanations, more 
fraud explanations are likely to be generated.  Of course, there are a host of other possibilities that could explain 
these results.  As I did not observe any significant interactions between Internet and my primary independent 
variables (Specialization and Skepticism Target), including Internet as a covariate properly controls for the effect. 
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38), I fail to observe a significant correlation between Judgment Fallibility and Unknown 
Misstatements (pone-tailed = 0.133).  Therefore, as a noise reduction technique, I summed all of the 
participant’s probabilities (misstatement and non-misstatement) and forced additivity to 100%.36  
This transformed variable Unknown Misstatements FA is significantly associated with the JS 
manipulation (pone-tailed = 0.011), satisfying the first test.  The JS manipulation is also positively 
associated with the mediator (Judgment Fallibility) satisfying Step 2 (pone-tailed = 0.057).  The data 
satisfies the third step as Judgment Fallibility is positively correlated with Unknown 
Misstatements FA (pone-tailed = 0.031).  However, when controlling for Judgment Fallibility, the JS 
manipulation is still associated with Unknown Misstatements FA (pone-tailed = 0.023) indicating 
partial mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986).  Partial mediation supports my theory that judgment 
skepticism preferences increase specialists’ consideration of unknown misstatement explanations 
by fostering self-criticism.  However, judgment skepticism preferences also increase 
consideration of unknown misstatements in other ways.  Future research could identify other 
features of judgment skepticism preferences that increase such consideration. 
5.4.3 Quality of Fraud Explanations 
 In this section, I examine qualitative differences between specialists’ and non-specialists’ 
fraud explanations.  Due to industry knowledge, it is likely that specialists’ fraud explanations 
incorporate more contextual industry-specific information making them better able to design 
appropriate audit tests.  An auditing professor with three years of auditing experience and I 
assigned context scores to the fraud explanations, while blind to the experimental conditions, 
                                               
36
 This transformation reduces noise by eliminating differences due to various interpretations of the probability 
scales.  All reported results are qualitatively unchanged using forced additivity measures.  An FA superscript 
denotes a forced additivity measure. 
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using a 3 point scale (1 = devoid of context, 2 = some context, 3 = rich context).37   The 
specialists’ fraud explanations (Fraud Context Score = 2.57) incorporated significantly more 
context than those of non-specialists (Fraud Context Score = 1.45; t25 = 4.34; ptwo-tailed < 0.001).  
As no Control-condition specialists generated a single fraud explanation, this result demonstrates 
the importance of promoting judgment skepticism in specialists as they appear well-equipped to 
consider potential frauds due to their industry knowledge. 
5.4.4 Other Professional Judgments 
 My hypothesis testing employed two professional judgments that reflect self-criticism in 
the absence of fraud risk indicators: unknown misstatements and fraud explanations.  In this 
section, I analyze participants’ other professional judgments: error explanations, non-
misstatement explanations, and aggregate risk assessments. 
To examine the effects of ES and JS on error explanations, I ran a repeated measures 
ANCOVA (Table 5) with the number and probability of generated error explanations as 
dependent variables.  Due to industry experience, specialists likely actively consider high 
frequency errors irrespective of supervisor preferences (Owhoso et al. 2002).  Accordingly, 
neither ES nor JS affect specialists’ number or probability of generated error explanations.  
Likewise, non-specialists likely actively consider errors due to conservatism associated with 
controlled processing triggered by industry unfamiliarity.  Although neither ES nor JS affect non-
specialists’ number of generated error explanations,  ES led to an increase in non-specialists’ 
probability of generated error explanations (ES = 0.16; Control = 0.06; F1,162 = 5.40; ptwo-tailed = 
0.021).  A post hoc explanation for this pattern of results is that non-specialists could not 
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 We initially agreed on 23 out of 27 fraud explanations resulting in an inter-rater agreement of 85.2% and a 
Cohen’s Kappa of 0.773 (p < 0.001). We mutually resolved all differences.     
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generate additional error explanations in response to evidence skepticism preferences, but 
viewed the preferences as diagnostic of increased risk of erroneous assertions. 
Consistent with academics and regulators viewing professional skepticism as attention to 
misstatement explanations (AICPA 2003; Nelson 2009), my results are generally consistent with 
ES and JS not affecting the number or probabilities of non-misstatement explanations with a 
notable exception.38  Consistent with JS activating unknown explanations in working memory, 
such preferences led to a decrease in the probability of unknown non-misstatement explanations 
in non-specialists (JS = 0.84; Control = 1.02; F1,163 = 3.42; ptwo-tailed = 0.066).  Non-specialists 
likely realize they are limited with respect to non-misstatement knowledge and, thus, view JS 
preferences as diagnostic of increased risk of misstatement and indicating that unknown non-
misstatement explanations are less probable.   
My integrated framework does not make clear predictions on the extent to which changes 
in self-critical professional judgments will be impounded into aggregate risk assessments.39  That 
is, increased self-criticism does not necessarily nor normatively lead to a perception of increased 
risk of misstatement especially considering the lack of a normative benchmark (i.e., higher risk 
assessments are not necessarily better). For participants’ risk assessments (RMM), none of the 
simple main effects of ES or JS versus Control are significant (all ptwo-tailed > 0.10) for either 
specialists or non-specialists.  Even though ES increased non-specialists’ probability of error 
explanations for non-specialists, the lack of results on RMM is not particularly surprising due to 
non-specialists typically being conservative in their risk assessments (Taylor 2000).   
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 To examine the effects on non-misstatement explanations, I ran a repeated measure ANCOVA (Table 6) with the 
four non-misstatement measures (number and probabilities of self-generated non-misstatement explanations and the 
probabilities of the management-provided explanation and unknown non-misstatement explanations).  Consistent 
with prior studies (Solomon et al. 1999), I observe a significant main effect of Specialization (p = 0.012).  All simple 
main effects of ES or JS versus Control are insignificant (all ptwo-tailed > 0.10) unless otherwise noted.   
39
 To examine the effects on risk assessments, I ran an ANCOVA (Table 7) with the participants’ aggregate risk 
assessment as the dependent variable.  Consistent with non-specialists’ conservative risk assessments in prior studies 
(Taylor 2000), I observe a significant main effect of Specialization (p = 0.026).   
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On the other hand, JS-condition specialists generated more fraud explanations and 
increased the probability of unknown misstatement explanations, but do not seem to impound the 
elevated self-criticism into their aggregate risk assessments.  For fraud explanations, the lack of 
increased risk assessments is not surprising as JS-condition specialists did not assign a 
significantly higher probability to fraud explanations.  Another possibility is that increased fraud 
consideration reduces the extent to which error explanations are impounded into risk assessments.  
As for the increased probability of unknown misstatements, JS-condition specialists may have 
difficulty aggregating what they do not know into risk assessments.  Then again, in the absence 
of fraud risk indicators, considering unknown misstatements and fraud explanations, but not 
increasing risk assessments may actually be appropriate from an audit efficiency standpoint. 
Although JS-condition specialists do not increase their risk assessments, there could still be 
considerable effects on audit planning and execution as the level of risk assessments are only one 
of many inputs (e.g., source of risk) into these decisions.  Future research that examines the 
relationship amongst self-critical professional judgments, risk assessments, and audit planning 
and execution would be beneficial.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I integrate dual-processing theory (Smith and DeCoster 2000; Evans 
2008) into Nelson’s (2009) model of professional skepticism.  The resulting integrated 
framework illustrates the critical role that the target of auditors’ skepticism – audit evidence or 
their own judgment and decision making – has on their professional judgments and how this role 
depends on other factors.  I then use my integrated framework to predict that industry 
specialization interacts with the target of professional skepticism in influencing professional 
judgments.  When working inside their specialization, auditors make more automatic, intuitive 
judgments.  As such, specialization leads to proficiency in evidence evaluation, but, in the 
absence of fraud risk indicators, inhibits self-critical thinking.  Thus, priming specialists to be 
skeptical of evidence has little to no effect on their judgments.  However, priming them to be 
skeptical of their judgment and decision making leads specialists to worry about what they do 
and do not know in an epistemological sense. 
My experimental results largely support my predictions.  Unprimed, specialists are less 
concerned than non-specialists about what they do not know.  The most striking evidence was 
that none of 19 specialists in the control-condition generated a single fraud explanation.  Yet, 
when primed to be skeptical of their judgment and decision making, specialists began to worry 
about unknown misstatements and well-concealed fraud. In fact, the largest increase (compared 
to unprimed professional judgments) in the number of fraud explanations and the probability of 
unknown misstatements occurs for JS-condition specialists compared to the increases of ES-
condition specialists, ES-condition non-specialists, and JS-condition non-specialists.  These 
results demonstrate that exercising judgment skepticism makes specialists not only experts in the 
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evaluating evidence, but also self-critical and circumspect about management fraud even when 
fraud is not overtly indicated by the evidence thereby increasing the justifiability of their beliefs.     
This dissertation is subject to several limitations in addition to those typically associated 
with experimental research.  One, I only captured professional judgments within preliminary 
analytical review and within one industry.  However, I am unaware of any theory that would 
suggest that auditors’ decision processes are fundamentally different with respect to other audit 
judgment tasks or different industries.  Two, my tests do not provide evidence on whether or not 
exercising judgment skepticism also leads specialists to question the informativeness of audit 
evidence (cf. Brown et al. 1999) as a result of increased self-criticism. Three, auditors may 
become sensitized to judgment skepticism with its benefits weakening over time.  Four, just 
because I observed theory-consistent increases in specialists’ self-critical professional judgments 
does not mean there are not boundary conditions on the effectiveness of judgment skepticism 
preferences. As there is considerable evidence that experts are overconfident in their judgments 
(e.g., Fischhoff et al. 1988; Zacharias and Shepherd 2001; Malmendier and Tate 2005), 
specialists may, under certain conditions, resist judgment skepticism preferences viewing self-
criticism as unnecessary or even become defensive as the preferences threaten their expertise.  
Five, Bell et al. (2005) recommend that auditors should use judgment skepticism as a 
complement to evidence skepticism.  A hybrid preference that strongly emphasizes both types of 
skepticism may be optimal in terms of self-critical professional judgments.  Six, I purposely 
employed an ill-structured audit task which does allow me to make some inferences about likely 
benefits in terms of justifiability, but precludes me from making normative statements about the 
reduction of auditor bias.  Future research could identify audit tasks with unambiguous 
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normative benchmarks and examine the efficacy of judgment skepticism as a debiaser (cf. 
Grenier, Peecher and Piercey 2009). 
This dissertation suggests several other directions for future research.  Researchers could 
examine how the target of auditors’ professional skepticism interacts with other auditor, task, or 
environmental factors in producing self-critical professional judgments.  For example, one could 
examine institutional features of auditing firms such as supervision and review that moderate the 
extent to which specialists are self-critical.  Researchers might also consider how different levels 
and types of audit risks, different judgment tasks with varying levels of complexity, and 
heterogeneous audit teams (i.e., specialists and non-specialists; Beck and Wu 2007) potentially 
moderate the inferences drawn in this study.   My integrate framework will help researchers 
predict the effects of these and other factors on professional judgments.  It would also be 
beneficial to examine how evaluators of auditors (e.g., regulators, jurors) view industry 
specialists’ documented self-critical professional judgments. Finally, future research could model 
how professional judgments affect risk assessments and the planning and execution of the audit. 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
Participant Number _________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
You are about to perform a preliminary analytical review exercise. Please do not discuss any 
details of this exercise with others during the exercise or after completion. 
 
BACKGROUND 
You will be performing a preliminary analytical review on the Premier Property and Casualty 
(PPC) audit engagement.   Founded in 1908 and based in Los Angeles, California, PPC is a 
medium-sized insurance company, with over 15,000 insured personal and commercial clients 
and over $130 million in premium revenue in 2006.   PPC is a publicly traded small cap stock 
listed on NASDAQ.  PPC is a longstanding and highly regarded client of your firm (48 years).  
 
PPC provides commercial and personal automobile insurance policies with each of these lines 
operating in niche markets. PPC sells commercial policies to businesses that maintain a fleet of 
vehicles such as shipping and trucking companies, rental car companies, hospitals, and large 
universities. These policies comprise approximately 65% of premium revenue. PPC sells 
personal policies to individuals looking to insure high-end, luxury vehicles (MSRP > $40,000). 
Personal policies comprise approximately 35% of premium revenue. 
 
STRATEGY AND PRODUCTS 
PPC’s long history in serving these niche markets helps the company sustain its competitive 
advantage of providing unparalleled customer service.  This outstanding customer service spans 
all facets of insurance from offering customized policies to 24 hour rapid response claims service.  
PPC takes pride in its longstanding relationships with its clients and takes every effort to keep 
them satisfied.   Consistent with the success of this strategy, the average commercial (personal) 
client has been with PPC for 15 (12) years with several clients having insured their vehicles with 
PPC for a much longer period.   
 
Due to its relatively small client base (compared to larger insurers), PPC underwriters are able to 
develop an in-depth understanding of their commercial clients’ operations. This understanding 
not only allows them to effectively price these policies, but also puts PPC in a better position to 
meet all of the client’s needs through customized group insurance policies. For example, besides 
traditional customizations such as deductibles and limits, PPC incorporates unusual covered 
losses and discounts unique to the client’s operations. PPC commercial agents are compensated 
not only for new policies, but also received large commissions for policy renewals. This system 
motivates agents to keep close contacts with their clients and ensure their satisfaction with PPC. 
 
Similar to commercial policies, PPC offers its personal policy clients significant customization 
options. As most clients are very wealthy and own multiple expensive vehicles, extremely high 
deductibles and limits are common customizations along with discounts for multiple and limited 
use vehicles. Consistent with its strategy, PPC's claims service for personal policies is designed 
to maximize customer satisfaction. For example, PPC guarantees to personally deliver a 
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comparable loaner vehicle within two hours of an automobile accident and takes care of 
obtaining all repair estimates. 
 
PPC’s agents specifically target individuals who own several of these vehicles (e.g., movie and 
sports stars, other celebrities, etc.). As with commercial policies, PPC personal agents are paid 
commissions for both new policies and renewals. PPC also has long standing relationships with 
several high-end automobile dealerships and pays referral bonuses to dealers who refer new 
customers to PPC. 
 
RISKS, INDUSTRY TRENDS, AND CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 
As with all insurance companies, interest rate risk is a major factor due to large investment 
portfolios and reliance on investment income for profitability.  The industry is also heavily 
regulated by state insurance departments that, among other things, cap the amount of premium 
that the company can charge and collects premium taxes.  The automobile insurance market has 
intense price competition.  Yet, the company operates in niche markets with a competitive 
advantage based on customer service allowing them to charge a slightly higher (but still 
reasonable and affordable) premium rate. 
 
In its annual report, PPC stresses that it takes its reputation for honesty and integrity seriously. 
PPC management has a long standing commitment to internal controls, forthcoming disclosure, 
and financial reporting transparency. Historically, the working relationship of your audit firm 
with PPC management has been very cooperative.  
 
Key business processes include 1) the underwriting of premium, 2) verifying and paying claims, 
3) attracting new business, and 4) investing. The firm believes PPC has sound controls over all of 
these processes. Last year, the firm issued an unqualified SOX 404 auditor’s report and an 
unqualified opinion on the financial statements. 
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PARTNER INSTRUCTIONS 
EVIDENCE SKEPTICISM CONDITION 
 
Recent professional standards and the PCAOB stress the exercising of professional skepticism to 
prevent and detect fraud. The engagement partner is concerned that our auditors sometimes 
might not exercise sufficient professional skepticism. Specifically, the engagement partner is 
concerned that our auditors sometimes fail to approach management-provided explanations and 
other audit evidence with sufficient professional skepticism. This concern is based on evidence 
that auditors across a variety of engagements do not actively question management assertions or 
critically assess audit evidence. Other examples of auditors not being sufficiently skeptical of 
evidence include: 
 
- Failure to gather sufficient information 
- Overweighting evidence that confirms expectations 
- Reliance on management’s honesty and integrity 
 
Please ensure that you are sufficiently skeptical of evidence when performing this analytical 
review. In 2-3 sentences, describe an instance when you were not sufficiently skeptical of 
management-provided explanations or other audit evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The partner on this task is primarily concerned… 
 
 with my judgment accuracy. 
 with me being skeptical of management-provided explanations and other audit evidence. 
 
Actively questioning management’s assertions and critically assessing audit evidence 
increases the effectiveness of audits. 
 
 True 
 False 
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PARTNER INSTRUCTIONS 
JUDGMENT SKEPTICISM CONDITION 
 
Recent professional standards and the PCAOB stress the exercising of professional skepticism to 
prevent and detect fraud. The engagement partner is concerned that our auditors sometimes 
might not exercise sufficient professional skepticism. Specifically, the engagement partner is 
concerned that our auditors, even when focused on accuracy, sometimes fail to actively consider 
the possibility of making incorrect judgments and decisions. This concern is based on pervasive 
evidence that experts in a variety of fields, such as medicine and law, tend to be overconfident in 
their judgments, and, on occasion, make incorrect judgments. Common expert errors include: 
 
- Failure to gather sufficient information 
- Overweighting evidence that confirms expectations 
- Overconfidence in own or others’ technical knowledge 
 
Please ensure that you are sufficiently skeptical when performing this analytical review in terms 
of considering the possibility of making incorrect judgments. 
 
In 2-3 sentences, describe an instance when you were overconfident precluding you from 
actively considering the possibility of making incorrect judgments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The partner on this task is primarily concerned… 
 
 with my judgment accuracy. 
 with me being skeptical of my judgment and decision making and actively considering 
the possibility of making incorrect judgments. 
 
Overconfidence sometimes leads to experts making incorrect judgments and, therefore, can be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of audits. 
 True 
 False 
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ANALYTICAL REVIEW INSTRUCTIONS 
You will next be presented with a significant unexpected fluctuation in PPC’s account balances 
along with a management-provided explanation. Your first task will be to assess the likelihood 
that the management-provided explanation substantially accounts for the entire fluctuation. Your 
second task will be to identify and list any alternative explanations and rate the associated 
likelihood that each explanation substantially accounts for the entire fluctuation. 
 
PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
During this preliminary analytical review, see Appendix 1 for PPC's financial statements. 
Insurance companies pay large up-front costs (e.g., sales commissions to insurance agents) to 
acquire business. As the costs of acquiring new insurance policies benefits the insurance 
company over the entire life of the policy, GAAP allows insurance companies to treat a portion 
of these costs as an asset rather than an immediate expense. These deferred policy acquisition 
costs include commissions, premium taxes, and other sales costs incurred in connection with 
writing business. These costs are capitalized and amortized over the policy period.  
 
This year, PPC’s deferred policy acquisition cost capitalization rate has increased significantly. 
Unearned premium represents the collected premium for the policy period remaining on in-force 
contracts.  
 
Summary information related to policy acquisition costs is listed below: 
 
 
       12/31/2007   12/31/2006 
Deferred Acquisition Costs  6,799,012   6,087,340 
Unearned Premium (UEP)  68,013,930   65,796,100 
DAC as a percent of UEP  10.0%    9.3% 
 
In response to your inquiry about the reason for the increase, management provided the 
following explanation: 
 
“We raised commission rates during 2007 in an attempt to boost premium. Thus, the amount of 
capitalized commission is higher in 2007 compared to 2006.” 
 
On a scale between 0 - 100 (0 = impossible; 100 = absolutely certain), what is the 
probability that the management-provided explanation accounts for substantially all of the 
observed fluctuation? 
 
Enter a value 0 – 100 _________ 
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Please list any other potential explanations for the increased capitalization rate.  And, on a 
scale between 0 - 100 (0 = impossible; 100 = absolutely certain), what is the probability that 
each of the explanations that you provide accounts for substantially all of the observed 
fluctuation? 
 
Other Potential Explanations Value  
0 - 100 
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On a scale between 0 - 100 (0 = impossible; 100 = absolutely certain), what is the probability that... 
 
an unlisted non-misstatement explanation accounts for 
substantially all of the observed fluctuation?   ________________ 
 
an unlisted explanation, involving a misstatement, 
accounts for substantially all of the observed fluctuation? ________________ 
 
On a scale between 0 - 100 (0 = impossible; 100 = absolutely certain), what is the probability that a 
combination of... 
 
non-misstatement explanations accounts for 
substantially all of the observed fluctuation?   _______________ 
 
misstatement explanations accounts for 
substantially all of the observed fluctuation?   _______________ 
 
both non-misstatement AND misstatement 
explanations accounts for substantially all of the 
observed fluctuation?      _______________ 
 
On a probability scale between 0 - 100 (0 = it is impossible that the balance is materially misstated; 
100 = it is absolutely certain that the balance is materially misstated), please assess the risk of 
material misstatement for the deferred acquisition cost balance. 
 
Enter value 0 – 100       _______________ 
 
In the previous question, you provided your best estimate of the risk of material misstatement for 
the deferred acquisition cost balance. Using the same 0 - 100 scale, within what range do you believe 
the true risk of material misstatement is? 
(Note: your previous answer should be somewhere within this range) 
 
Lowest possible risk of material misstatement   _______________ 
 
Highest possible risk of material misstatement   _______________ 
 
Last year, the engagement team budgeted and spent 12 hours auditing the deferred acquisition cost 
balance. How many hours would you like to budget for the current year audit? 
 
Enter a value > 0      _______________ 
 
On a scale between 0 - 100 (0 = no confidence; 100 = extreme confidence), how confident are you in 
your assessments? 
 
Enter a value 0 – 100      _______________ 
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 WRAP-UP QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Experience Level 
 Partner 
 Senior Manager 
 Manager 
 Senior 
 Staff 
 
2.  Industry Specialization 
 Insurance 
 Manufacturing 
 Banking 
 Real Estate 
 Health Care 
 Telecommunications 
 Utilities 
 Technology 
 Government 
 Non-profit 
 Entertainment 
 Other 
 None 
 
3.  Number of Years of Auditing Experience  ______________ years 
 
4.  Years of Experience Auditing… 
 
property and casualty insurance clients   ______________ years 
 
life and health insurance clients    ______________ years 
 
other financial services clients    ______________ years 
 
clients in other industries     ______________ years 
 
5.  Percent of Year Spent Auditing… 
(please sum to 100) 
 
property and casualty insurance clients   ______________ percent 
 
life and health insurance clients    ______________ percent 
 
other financial services clients    ______________ percent 
 
clients in other industries     ______________ percent 
 52 
6.  How much experience do you have performing preliminary analytical review for... 
 
property and casualty insurance clients 
 
 
no experience        extensive experience 
 
life and health insurance clients 
 
 
no experience        extensive experience 
 
other financial services clients 
 
 
no experience        extensive experience 
 
clients in other industries 
 
 
no experience        extensive experience 
 
7.  How would you assess your auditing relevant knowledge compared to... 
 
your peers with the same rank and industry specialization 
 
 
I am much less         I am much more 
knowledgeable        knowledgeable 
 
your peers with the same rank but different industry specialization 
 
 
I am much less         I am much more 
knowledgeable        knowledgeable 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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8.  To what extent... 
(Please circle number.  If N/A, leave scale blank and circle N/A) 
 
did you consider that you might be overconfident in your judgments?  
 
 
not at all         to a great extent  N/A 
 
did you consider the potential fallibility of your judgments and decisions?  
 
 
not at all         to a great extent  N/A 
 
was the partner in this exercise concerned with the ACCURACY of your judgments?  (not in Control)  
 
 
not at all         to a great extent  N/A 
 
did the partner's skepticism request make you defensive? (not in Control) 
 
 
not at all         to a great extent  N/A 
 
9.  Please rate yourself on the following scale. 
 
On the typical client, I try to avoid... 
 
 
 
upsetting the client needlessly      missing a misstatement 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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10.  Within your industry specialization (or the industry within you work the majority of the time if you are not an 
industry specialist), how common are MATERIAL misstatements? 
 
MATERIAL misstatements are...     
 
 
 
very uncommon         very common 
 
11.  Approximately how many, if any,... 
 
MATERIAL misstatements have you personally detected? _____________  
 
audit engagements have you been a member of where a  
MATERIAL misstatement was detected?   _____________ 
 
12.  To which charity would you like the researcher to donate money? 
 
 American Cancer Society 
 Salvation Army 
 St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital 
 American Red Cross 
 Humane Society 
13.  Approximately how much time, in minutes, did this task require?    ____________ Minutes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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PPC Financial Statements 
Income Statement  
 2007 2006 
REVENUES 
Net premiums earned 142,582 136,604 
Investment income 6,995 6,268 
Net realized gains (losses) on securities 1,093 (94) 
Total revenues 150,670 142,778 
 
EXPENSES 
Losses and loss adjustment expenses 106,794 102,043 
Policy acquisition costs 22,328 19,903 
Other underwriting expenses 11,264 10,519 
Investment expenses 121 115 
Total expenses 140,507 132,580 
 
NET INCOME 
Income before income taxes 10,163 10,198 
Provision for income taxes 3,064 3,416 
Net income 7,099 6,782 
 
 
Balance Sheet 12/31/2007 12/31/2006 
ASSETS 
Investments 145,538 142,132 
Cash 60 53 
Accrued investment income 1,460 1,300 
Premiums receivable, net of allowance for doubtful accounts of $1,906 and $1,852) 38,692 37,914 
Deferred acquisition costs 6,799 6,087 
Income Taxes 637 73 
Property and equipment, net of accumulated depreciation of $9,791 and $9,037) 16,171 15,792 
Other assets 3,233 3,292 
Total assets 212,590 206,643 
 
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 
Unearned premiums 68,014 65,796 
Loss and loss adjustment expense reserves 62,023 58,330 
Accounts payable, accrued expenses, and other liabilities 22,110 21,097 
Total liabilities 152,147 145,223 
   
Common shares, $1.00 par value 6,858 6,711 
Paid-in capital 7,638 7,599 
Net unrealized gains on investments 3,108 5,419 
Retained earnings 42,839 41,691 
Total shareholders' equity 60,443 61,420 
   
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 212,590 206,643 
*all figures in thousands 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OF OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES 
Evidence Skepticism Judgment Skepticism 
Please ensure that you are sufficiently skeptical of evidence 
when performing this analytical review. In 2-3 sentences, 
describe an instance when you were not sufficiently skeptical 
of management-provided explanations or other audit 
evidence. 
Please ensure that you are sufficiently skeptical when 
performing this analytical review in terms of considering the 
possibility of making incorrect judgments.  In 2-3 sentences, 
describe an instance when you were overconfident precluding 
you from actively considering the possibility of making 
incorrect judgments. 
Responses 
During my first busy season, I took the word of the HR dept 
regarding headcounts of one of my client’s subsidiaries and it 
turned out to be wrong. 
While auditing a low risk routine area such as fixed assets, 
assumed the depreciation expense was right although the 
analytical procedures were not within our precision range.  I 
was confident that the number had to be right, but there were 
variables in our analytic that were not considered. 
With certain clients with very qualified personnel and a 
history of "adjustment-free" audits, I tend to be more 
trustworthy and less skeptical.  A client of mine recently 
made a .5% change to their DAC calculation and looking 
back I didn't really question their motives. 
I had been on the same client for 5 years and knew their 
business very well, however, they developed a new business 
line and it performed better than expected.  The actuaries that 
reviewed the claims experience felt the reserve was 
overstated.  I was too focused on my prior knowledge to 
entertain the notion that perhaps they should reduce the 
reserve. 
Management representations are often over-relied upon in 
lieu of obtaining substantive audit evidence.  For example, I 
had an experience where a company had assets held for sale 
and a large part of the audit evidence supporting the fair 
value was management representation in lieu of specific fair 
value computations. 
On our team, we have encountered times when we were 
confident that an error we suspected was present would be 
immaterial.  We did do further testing and discovered that it 
was not, but probably would not have done so without the 
guidance and involvement of more senior members of the 
engagement team. 
During substantive analytics over payroll, we did not verify 
the average compensation percentages provided by the 
benefits manager as the amounts provided confirmed our 
expected payroll expense.  The payroll expense was 
recalculated after looking at the year-end ledger balance. 
On one certain client that I was on, I had a very strong 
knowledge of their business and related accounts (their 
business was very consistent year over year).  When 
performing account fluctuations, I may have been 
overconfident in my ability to predict the relationship of 
certain accounts, whereas the reason for the increase may 
have been due to another reason other than my expectation 
(i.e. flat change may have been a "netting" of two changes, 
rather than no change in the account). 
We believed we had all of the Restricted Stock Award 
Agreements applicable to the client's Stock Incentive Plan, 
because they were publicly filed, so we had made certain 
conclusions around accounting for award modifications based 
on those agreements. We did not sufficiently question 
management as to whether there were additional agreements 
specific to each employee which further explained the terms 
of the r-stock awards and ended up changing our conclusions 
for accounting for award modifications. 
On an engagement that I have been on for several years, I 
reviewed the client's loss reserves similar to how I had 
reviewed them in prior year.  I was so confident that I 
understood the reserving methodology that I did not consider 
that I could have misunderstood how the reserving was set in 
the current year. 
In performing routine inquiries (e.g., is management aware of 
any adverse regulatory communications, any adverse results 
of other external exams/audits, etc), I accepted management's 
responses without much skepticism.  The inquiries have not 
identified such matters in the past and management has 
trustworthy track record. 
Upon taking on a job that was new to me as a manager I 
placed more reliance than I should have on the prior team's 
work.  I should have spent more time challenging some of the 
conclusions and understanding them such that I could own 
them throughout the audit process. 
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FIGURES
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FIGURE 1: NELSON’S (2009) MODEL OF PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM 
 
 
 
 
Nelson’s (2009) model illustrates how auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives combine with audit evidence to produce 
judgments and actions that reflect professional skepticism.  The model is recursive in that evidence is both an input (evidential 
input; Link 2) and output (evidential output; Link 11) of auditor decision processing whereby the output evidence becomes part 
of the auditor’s experience (Link 12) and future input evidence into subsequent decision processing (Link 13).  Skeptical 
judgments relate to the auditor’s cognition and state of mind (e.g., hypothesis generation and probability judgment) and must 
reach a threshold to produce skeptical actions (Link 1; Shaub and Lawrence 1996).  Skeptical actions are an attribute of auditor 
performance (e.g., planning decisions, disposition of audit differences, audit reporting).   
 
In addition to evidence, the model includes three determinants of skeptical judgments (Links 3-5) and actions (Links 8-10): 
knowledge, traits, and incentives. Knowledge is a product of audit experience/specialization (Link 7) and traits (Link 6) and 
includes knowledge of evidential patterns and frequencies of non-misstatement and misstatement explanations. Traits are non-
knowledge attributes of the auditor that are usually considered fixed once the auditor commences audit experience and training.  
Nelson (2009) divides traits into three categories: problem-solving ability, ethical/moral reasoning, and dispositional skepticism 
(e.g., Hurtt 2009).  Auditors balance a multitude of countervailing PS-related incentives that may be direct or indirect, immediate 
or probabilistic, and financial or social (Nelson 2009).   
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FIGURE 2: A DUAL-PROCESS REPRESENTATION OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 
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FIGURE 3: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES 
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H2 was tested using the contrast: 3*(JSS -CS)-1/3*(ESS –CS +JSNS +ESNS –2*CNS) > 0 
 
Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A). 
  
The change on the y-axis refers to the difference from either the specialist or non-specialist Control condition. 
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FIGURE 4: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
Panel A: Unknown Misstatement Explanations - Levels (Table 2) a 
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FIGURE 4 (CONT.) 
 
Panel C: Fraud Explanations - Levels (Table 3) a 
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Panel D: Fraud Explanations - Differences (Table 3) a,b 
 
H2: Fraud Explanations (Differences)
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a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A). 
b In Panels B and D, the change on the y-axis refers to the difference from either the specialist or non-specialist Control condition. 
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TABLES
 64 
TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
 Specialists a Non-specialists a 
N n = 58 n = 113 
Experience Level (n) Partner                                    5 
Senior Manager                    17 
Manager                                 8 
Senior                                   26 
Staff                                       2 
Partner                                         4 
Senior Manager                         12 
Manager                                      7 
Senior                                        84 
Staff                                            6 
Firm Size (n) Big 4                                     51 
Other                                       7          
Big 4                                       106 
Other                                           7 
Years of experience 
       General 
       P&C Insurance 
       L&H Insurance 
       Other Financial Services 
       Other Industries 
 
6.67 
3.89 
3.24 
2.60 
2.92 
 
5.14 
0.26 
0.15 
1.47 
4.37 
Percent of year: 
       P&C Insurance 
       L&H Insurance 
       Other Financial Services 
       Other Industries 
 
39.7% 
37.7% 
10.1% 
12.5% 
 
0.9% 
1.0% 
25.4% 
72.7% 
Experience performing 
preliminary analytical review 
(11pt Likert scale): 
       P&C Insurance 
       L&H Insurance 
       Other Financial Services 
       Other Industries 
 
 
 
5.68 
4.95 
4.00 
4.44 
 
 
 
0.66 
0.61 
2.96 
6.84 
 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry. 
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TABLE 2: UNKNOWN MISSTATEMENT EXPLANATIONS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics a 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 n=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
Unknown Misstatements 0.987 0.755 1.253 0.998 1.062 1.035 1.047 1.048 
  
0.625 0.530 0.527 0.590 0.598 0.567 0.562 0.571 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance b 
Source SS df MS F p 
Skepticism Target  1.627 2 0.814 2.599 0.077 
Specialization 0.243 1 0.243 0.776 0.380 
Skepticism Target  x Specialization 1.075 2 0.537 1.716 0.183 
Misstatement Sensitivity 1.640 1 1.640 5.238 0.023 
Non-Specialists’ Insurance and Closely-Related Experience 1.330 1 1.330 4.250 0.041 
Error 51.028 163 0.313     
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons c 
  Unknown Misstatements 
Contrast F1,163 p 
H1: CNS- CS > 0 3.262 0.036 
H2: 3*(JSS -CS)-1/3*(ESS –CS +JSNS +ESNS –2*CNS) > 0 4.094 0.022 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Unknown Misstatements: the total probability assigned to unknown misstatement 
explanations. 
b Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); Misstatement Sensitivity:  reported 
frequency of misstatements within their industry specialization;  Non-Specialists’ Insurance and Closely-Related Experience:  percent of year 
auditing insurance and other financial services clients * Specialization. 
c All p-values in Panel C are one-tailed due to a directional prediction. 
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TABLE 3: FRAUD EXPLANATIONS – FACTOR SCORE 
 
Panel A: Factor Analysis a 
 Component #1 
Number of Fraud Explanations 0.941 
Probability of Fraud Explanations 0.941 
  
Eigenvalue 1.770 
Percentage of Variance Explained 88.52% 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics b 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 N=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
Fraud Factor Score 0.055 -0.326 0.138 -0.042 -0.075 0.033 0.113 0.022 
  
1.388 0.000 1.311 1.107 0.989 0.804 1.068 0.945 
 
Panel C: Analysis of Covariance c 
Source SS Df MS F p 
 Specialization  0.575 1 0.575 0.609 0.436 
 Skepticism Target  2.998 2 1.499 1.589 0.207 
 Specialization x Skepticism Target  1.845 2 0.922 0.978 0.378 
 Judgment Fallibility  3.782 1 3.782 4.009 0.047 
 Overconfidence  11.582 1 11.582 12.277 0.001 
 Internet  4.983 1 4.983 5.282 0.023 
 Error  152.832 162 0.943     
 
Panel D: Planned Comparisons d 
 Fraud Factor 
Score 
Contrast F1,162 p 
H1: CNS - CS > 0 2.578 0.055 
H2: 3*(JSS -CS)-1/3*(ESS –CS+JSNS+ESNS –2*CNS) > 0 1.300 0.128 
 
a Number of Fraud Explanations: The number of self-generated fraud explanations; Probability of Fraud Explanations: The sum of the 
probabilities for each self-generated fraud explanation. 
b Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Fraud Factor Score: factor score from factor analysis in Panel A. 
c Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); Judgment Fallibility:  reported 
consideration of judgment fallibility;  Overconfidence :  reported consideration of overconfidence;  Internet: dummy variable for internet-based 
participants. 
d All p-values in Panel D are one-tailed due to a directional prediction. 
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TABLE 4: FRAUD EXPLANATIONS – RAW DATA 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics a 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 N=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
Number Fraud 
Explanations 
0.150  0.000  0.211  0.121  0.108  0.214  0.206  0.177  
 
0.489  0.000  0.535  0.422  0.393  0.470  0.479  0.448  
Probability Fraud 
Explanations 
0.068  0.000  0.071  0.047  0.041  0.034  0.064  0.045  
 
0.279  0.000  0.235  0.211  0.182  0.117  0.193  0.164  
 
Panel B: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance b 
Source SS Df MS F p 
Between-Participant Factors           
 Specialization  0.171 1 0.171 1.040 0.309 
 Skepticism Target 0.446 2 0.223 1.361 0.259 
 Specialization x Skepticism Target 0.381 2 0.190 1.162 0.316 
 Judgment Fallibility 0.609 1 0.609 3.716 0.056 
 Overconfidence 1.810 1 1.810 11.041 0.001 
 Internet  0.970 1 0.970 5.918 0.016 
 Error  26.559 162 0.164     
  
   
  
 Within-Participant Factors       
 Type 0.010 1 0.010 0.193 0.661 
 Type x Specialization  0.138 1 0.138 2.770 0.098 
 Type x Skepticism Target 0.055 2 0.027 0.549 0.579 
 Type x Specialization x Skepticism Target 0.139 2 0.070 1.397 0.250 
 Type x Judgment Fallibility 0.081 1 0.081 1.621 0.205 
 Type x Overconfidence 0.201 1 0.201 4.032 0.046 
 Type x Internet  0.291 1 0.291 5.852 0.017 
 Error  8.069 162 0.050     
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons c 
 Number Fraud 
Explanations  
Probability Fraud 
Explanations 
Contrast F1,162 p F1,162 p 
H1: CNS - CS > 0 4.546 0.017 0.774 0.190 
H2: 3*(JSS -CS)-1/3*(ESS –CS+JSNS+ESNS –2*CNS) > 0 2.046 0.077 0.501 0.240 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Number Fraud Explanations: The number of self-generated fraud explanations; Probability 
Fraud Explanations: The sum of the probabilities for each self-generated fraud explanation. 
b Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); Judgment Fallibility:  reported 
consideration of judgment fallibility;  Overconfidence :  reported consideration of overconfidence;  Internet: dummy variable for internet-based 
participants; Type: within-subjects manipulation of dependent variables (Number Fraud Explanations; Probability Fraud Explanations) 
c All p-values in Panel C are one-tailed due to a directional prediction. 
 68 
TABLE 5: ERROR EXPLANATIONS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics a 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 N=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
Number Error 
Explanations 
0.130 0.061 0.066 0.086 0.157 0.060 0.107 0.106 
 
0.198 0.125 0.127 0.156 0.327 0.174 0.198 0.242 
Probability Error 
Explanations 
0.500 0.316 0.368 0.397 0.459 0.310 0.500 0.416 
 
0.513 0.478 0.684 0.560 0.767 0.749 0.862 0.787 
 
Panel B: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance b 
Source SS Df MS F p 
Between-Participant Factors           
 Specialization  0.180 1 0.180 0.469 0.494 
 Skepticism Target 0.583 2 0.291 0.760 0.469 
 Specialization x Skepticism Target 0.523 2 0.261 0.683 0.507 
 Judgment Fallibility 1.779 1 1.779 4.645 0.033 
 Years of Experience 3.664 1 3.664 9.565 0.002 
 Error  62.437 163 0.383     
  
   
  
 Within-Participant Factors       
 Type 0.144 1 0.144 0.949 0.332 
 Type x Specialization  0.024 1 0.024 0.158 0.692 
 Type x Skepticism Target 0.063 2 0.032 0.209 0.812 
 Type x Specialization x Skepticism Target 0.187 2 0.094 0.615 0.542 
 Type x Judgment Fallibility 0.802 1 0.802 5.277 0.023 
 Type x Years of Experience 1.493 1 1.493 9.830 0.002 
 Error  24.762 163 0.152     
 
Panel C: Simple Main Effects c 
 Number Error 
Explanations  
Probability Error 
Explanations 
Contrast F1,163 p F1,163 p 
Non-Specialists: ES - Control 1.910 0.169 5.402 0.021 
Non-Specialists: JS - Control 2.290 0.132 1.463 0.228 
Specialists: ES - Control 0.047 0.829 0.338 0.562 
Specialists: JS - Control 0.128 0.721 0.107 0.743 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Number Error Explanations: The number of self-generated error explanations; Probability 
Error Explanations: The sum of the probabilities for each self-generated error explanation. 
b Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); Judgment Fallibility:  reported 
consideration of judgment fallibility;  Years of Experience:  years of auditing experience;  Type: within-subjects manipulation of dependent 
variables (Number Error Explanations; Probability Error Explanations) 
c All p-values in Panel C are two-tailed due to the lack of a directional prediction. 
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TABLE 6: NON-MISSTATEMENT EXPLANATIONS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics a 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 N=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
Number Non-Misstatement  
Explanations 
2.600 2.316 2.316 2.414 1.676 1.595 1.912 1.717 
 1.818 1.635 1.293 1.579 1.334 1.432 1.464 1.405 
Probability Non-Misstatement  
Explanations 
0.917 0.884 0.950 0.917 0.576 0.471 0.531 0.523 
 0.971 0.796 0.834 0.857 0.567 0.552 0.382 0.510 
Management Explanation 0.574 0.553 0.508 0.545 0.454 0.511 0.516 0.494 
 0.209 0.261 0.222 0.229 0.224 0.240 0.183 0.219 
Unknown Non-Misstatements 0.911 0.943 1.016 0.956 0.867 1.023 0.843 0.918 
 0.477 0.412 0.373 0.419 0.453 0.462 0.356 0.434 
 
Panel B: Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance b 
Source SS Df MS F p 
Between-Participant Factors           
 Specialization  5.099 1 5.099 5.161 0.024 
 Skepticism Target 0.055 2 0.027 0.028 0.973 
 Specialization x Skepticism Target 0.277 2 0.139 0.140 0.869 
 General Confidence 1.779 1 1.779 1.800 0.182 
 Internet 8.673 1 8.673 8.779 0.004 
 Error  161.024 163 0.988     
       
 Within-Participant Factors       
 Type 0.788 3 0.263 0.454 0.715 
 Type x Specialization  3.479 3 1.160 2.004 0.113 
 Type x Skepticism Target 0.773 6 0.129 0.223 0.969 
 Type x Specialization x Skepticism Target 2.116 6 0.353 0.609 0.723 
 Type x General Confidence 4.538 3 1.513 2.614 0.051 
 Type x Internet 12.102 3 4.034 6.970 0.000 
 Error  283.020 489 0.579     
 
Panel C: Simple Main Effects c 
 Number  
Non-Misstatement 
Explanations  
Probability  
Non-Misstatement 
Explanations 
Management 
Explanation 
Unknown Non-
Misstatements 
Contrast F1,163 p F1,163 p F1,163 p F1,163 p 
Non-Specialists: ES - Control 0.049 0.825 0.611 0.435 0.560 0.455 2.650 0.105 
Non-Specialists: JS - Control 0.799 0.373 0.157 0.693 0.052 0.820 3.417 0.066 
Specialists: ES - Control 0.159 0.691 0.002 0.965 0.189 0.664 0.084 0.772 
Specialists: JS - Control 0.052 0.820 0.032 0.859 0.289 0.592 0.218 0.641 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Number Non-Misstatement Explanations: The number of self-generated non-misstatement 
explanations; Probability Non-Misstatement Explanations: The sum of the probabilities for each self-generated non-misstatement explanation; 
Management  Explanation: The probability of the management-provided explanation; Unknown Non-Misstatements: the total probability assigned 
to unknown non-misstatement explanations 
b Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); General Confidence:  knowledge relative 
to industry specialization peers;  Internet: dummy variable for internet-based participants; Type: within-subjects manipulation of dependent 
variables (Number Non-Misstatement  Explanations; Probability Non-Misstatement Explanations; Management Explanation, Unknown Non-
Misstatements) 
c All p-values in Panel C are two-tailed due to the lack of a directional prediction. 
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TABLE 7: RISK ASSESSMENTS 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics a 
 (Mean, Std Dev)  Specialists Non-Specialists 
  ES Control JS Total ES Control JS Total 
Dependent Variable n=20 n=19 n=19 n=58 n=37 n=42 n=34 n=113 
RMM 0.306 0.242 0.315 0.288 0.353 0.412 0.388 0.386 
  
0.221 0.174 0.249 0.215 0.210 0.276 0.204 0.234 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Covariance b 
Source SS df MS F p 
Skepticism Target  175.450 2 87.725 0.170 0.844 
Specialization 2607.657 1 2607.657 5.044 0.026 
Skepticism Target  x Specialization 922.030 2 461.015 0.892 0.412 
Misstatement Sensitivity 1941.236 1 1941.236 3.755 0.054 
Error 84792.984 164 517.030   
 
 
Panel C: Simple Main Effects c 
 RMM  
Contrast F1,164 p 
Non-Specialists: ES - Control 1.106 0.294 
Non-Specialists: JS - Control 0.037 0.848 
Specialists: ES – Control 0.780 0.378 
Specialists: JS – Control 0.664 0.416 
 
a  Specialists: Participants specializing within the insurance industry; Non-specialists: Participants specializing within any other industry; ES: 
Participants in the evidence skepticism condition (See Appendix A); Control : Participants in the control condition (unprimed); JS: Participants in 
the judgment skepticism condition (See Appendix A); RMM: risk of material misstatement. 
b Specialization (Specialists = 0, Non-Specialists = 1); Skepticism Target  (ES = 0, Control = 1, JS = 2); Misstatement Sensitivity:  reported 
frequency of misstatements within their industry specialization;. 
c All p-values in Panel C are two-tailed due to a lack of a directional prediction. 
 
 
